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Abstract
An interactive proof is a conversation between a powerful machine, the ‘prover’, and a
‘verifier’ with low resources. The aim of the conversation is for the prover to convince
the verifier about the output of a function (that is computationally or space intensive to
evaluate) over some shared data set. The concept of streaming interactive proofs (SIPs)
considers a verifier with very small space, who streams the shared data, and then engages
in an interactive protocol with the prover.
Our work begins by looking to improve protocols for the practical verification of
outsourced data analysis. We explore non-interactive and multi-round protocols for vector
and matrix multiplications and analyse the real-world practicality of these approaches. We
demonstrate how these protocols can be used in data analysis, considering the numerical
concerns when rounding is required. We investigate the costs for the verifier, while trying
to keep the overheads for the prover at a minimum, and discuss bottlenecks.
Finally, we introduce the entirely new concept of Streaming Zero Knowledge for
interactive proofs, which is the adaptation of regular SIPs where now the verifier learns no
additional information about the data set besides the truth of the statement the prover is
trying to prove. We show several examples and build up a powerful multipurpose protocol





The work in this thesis is designed to further improve our understanding of the powers of
streaming interactive proofs (SIPs) [Cormode et al., 2011]. SIPs are a theoretical notion
inspired by the real world setting of cloud computing. We consider a situation in which a
client (hereafter referred to as the verifier), with very few computational resources but large
amounts of data, can use a powerful second party to perform analysis on the data whilst
maintaining confidence the analysis is performed correctly. The crux of the setting is that
it’s much easier to check work than it is to do work.
Our task is to create protocols that let the verifier outsource work to a powerful
helper, such as Amazon Web Services or Microsoft Azure, whilst still having the verifier
do a small amount of work in order to check the outsourced work is done correctly. These
online cloud services are prone to failures, and relinquish any guarantee of flawless and cor-
rect computation in their terms and conditions [AWS, 2020]. The setting of checking cloud
computing covers not only the idea of a weak verifier checking work sent to a super com-
puter, but also covers distributed computation, where a comparatively weak server checks
the work of a huge network of computers. An example of this would be SETI@home,
which used redundancy, i.e., many computers repeating the work of others, to find errors
[SETI@home, 1999], but could achieve better guarantees through SIPs.
Our work aims to provide a way for weak verifiers to perform basic analysis on large
data streams, initially investigating the setting where the verifier receives a message from
powerful second party (hereafter called the prover), but cannot communicate further. We
then examine the consequences of adding interactivity where the prover and verifier have a
short conversation in order to allow the verifier to be convinced using less total communica-
tion. Our final technical chapter studies the concept of zero knowledge [Goldwasser et al.,
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1985], where the prover attempts to convince the verifier of a fact regarding the data set, but
with the added task of making sure no extra information the verifier couldn’t compute on
it’s own is released in the messages. The setting of this final exploration is less immediate,
it represents a scenario whereby a verifier with little space sees a dataset, and then wants
to perform computation on it, but with the data being secure now to further leakage to the
verifier, beyond what was already known.
1.2 Core Definitions and Intuition
We will now further detail the concepts within interactive proofs. To begin with our verifier
is a probabilistic polynomial-time turing machine (PPT), whilst our prover is unbounded
in both space and time. The first question to ask should be ‘what does it mean to prove
something?’. We want our verifier to be convinced that a solution to a problem is correct,
but how should we define correct?
This is where the concept of completeness and soundness come in. Say our verifier
is attempting to compute f(x), where f is a complex function to compute with an input x.
Our prover is trying to prove that y = f(x). If it is indeed true that y = f(x) we want our
verifier to accept the proof; this is the concept of completeness. If it’s false, so y 6= f(x),
we want our verifier to reject the proof, even in the presence of a malicious prover, and this
is the concept of soundness. If an algorithm for proving a particular statement is both sound
and complete, then it is an interactive proof system. However, this definition is incredibly
strict, and for the majority of problems, it’s near impossible to achieve both completeness,
soundness, and efficiency (sublinear proof size and speed). In our work, and much of the
prior work, we allow slight leniency to vastly increase the power of the class. We say that
an interactive proof system is still considered sound if a verifier rejects false claims more
than 23 of the time.
A vital part of interactive proofs is of course the idea of interactivity. The main
power of the verifier in an interactive proof system versus a non-interactive proof system
is that now the verifier can quiz the prover on messages the prover sends. We will see
plenty of examples where the fact the verifier has private randomness and can challenge the
prover to provide consistent responses allows for short interactive proofs with incredibly
high soundness.
Now we can begin to answer the question of what exactly it is interactive proofs
can do. It follows immediately with even perfect soundness that any problem in NP has an
interactive proof system. The class NP covers all decision problems where, when the answer
is ‘yes’, there is a proof of this verifiable in polynomial time. For example, our helper can
prove to a verifier that a graph has a 3-colouring by simply sending the 3-colouring. When
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we remove the requirement of perfect soundness, the remarkable result is that we can solve
any problem in PSPACE, the set of all problems that can be solved in polynomial space
[Shamir, 1992; Lund et al., 1992].
1.3 Our Results and Roadmap
Our results can be split largely into three parts. Firstly, we investigate non-interactive proofs
for data analysis (Chapter 3). We build on a prior annotated matrix multiplication protocol,
and show the protocol is optimal up to constant factors. We use this to develop annotated
streaming protocols for a variety of further problems involving approximations, such as
finding eigenvalues and matrix inversion. We demonstrate practical data science primitives
and show that these protocols allow the verifier to run significantly faster than solving the
problem alone.
In the next chapter (Chapter 4), we delve into the practicality of streaming inter-
active proofs. We adapt several existing protocols, and develop some new protocols with
variable interactivity, specifically allowing and discussing the costs incurred when the pro-
tocol designer can choose the number of rounds. We then run a series of experiments to
test which properties of a SIP should be optimised in order to minimize the time the entire
protocol takes.
In the final content chapter (Chapter 5), we discuss the potential for zero knowl-
edge streaming interactive proofs, where the zero knowledge security comes from the ver-
ifier’s space bound restricting it from learning additional information about a previously
seen stream when interacting with the prover. We introduce the concept of spatial commit-
ment schemes, and show how these allow us to create zero knowledge streaming interactive




In this chapter we make our previous notions rigorous, and discuss relevant work in the
world of streaming interactive proofs, and the world of proof systems in general.
2.1 Building the Notion of an Interactive Proof System
A ‘interactive proof system’ is simply a conversation between two players, one player (the
prover) is trying to convince the other (the verifier) that a particular statement is true. In
order to build up our intuition, we will slowly work through the concepts involved in an
interactive proof to lead to a strong definition allowing us to truly understand their power.
2.1.1 Languages and Decision Problems
First, the idea of proving a statement is true is equivalent to checking that, given some
Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, an input x ∈ {0, 1}n satisfies f(x) = 1. This
Boolean function f defines a language Lf = {x ∈ {0, 1}n : f(x) = 1}. If the verifier is
polynomial time, it can evaluate Boolean functions where computing f(x) for x ∈ {0, 1}n
requires O(nc) steps, for some constant c > 0. We will write poly(n) when referring to
something that is O(nc) for some constant c ∈ N from here onwards.
A polynomial time verifier doesn’t need help in order to solve a language in the
complexity class P, which is the set of all languages that can be ‘decided’ in polynomial
time (i.e. it can explicitly compute f(x) to see if x ∈ L). This complexity class includes
a number of common problems such as maximum matchings, calculating the greatest com-
mon divisor, even determining if a number is prime [Agrawal et al., 2004]. However, many
other useful problems are (likely) not in P. This is why we introduce the prover, to help the
verifier evaluate more complex functions.
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It’s worth noting that whilst originally interactive proofs were introduced to allow
polynomial time verifier’s to solve problems in larger complexity classes [Babai, 1985;
Goldwasser et al., 1985], this thesis largely investigates the power of interaction in speeding
up problems from P, that would otherwise take a verifier a large amount of time or space.
However, we will explore some of the historical basis for interactive proofs as it gives
insight into the incredible power of proof systems.
This thesis will be working with streaming interactive proof systems (SIPs), where
the verifier doesn’t have the space to store x, and instead reads it in one pass. Once we
have formally defined interactive proofs, we will move onto proofs with a space-bounded
verifier.
2.1.2 Introducing Proofs
The complexity class NP captures the notion of checking x ∈ Lf . It is the set of all
languages that can be verified in polynomial time. Imagine we want to check x ∈ Lf ,
but we can’t compute f(x) in polynomial time. If the language Lf , with corresponding
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, is in NP that means there is a g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}poly(n) → {0, 1}
and a ‘proof’, w ∈ {0, 1}poly(n) (also known as a ‘witness’ or ‘certificate’), such that
g(x,w) = 1
and g can be evaluated in polynomial time. In simpler terms, if we want to check x ∈ L, we
can get a more powerful computer to send us w, and we can then use w to confirm x ∈ L
in polynomial time.
This is our first example of a proof system. However, it’s not currently very well
defined. What if the prover sends some arbitrary w such that g(x,w) 6= f(x)? What if
the prover can’t find an appropriate w? We need to capture the real necessities of a proof.
Recall that we want a proof to be complete and sound. Loosely speaking, completeness
tells us that a honest prover will indeed be able to send a w such that g(x,w) = 1 if x ∈ L.
Soundness tells us that a dishonest prover can not find a w such that g(x,w) = 1 if x /∈ L.
If we require that the function g satisfies these conditions, we have achieved a proof system,
and can show that the language is in the complexity class NP.
2.1.3 The Power of Interaction?
Within the notion of a proof system outlined in the previous section, the prover’s role is to
find a suitable witness, so the verifier can check it without the need for interaction with the
prover. NP covers a lot of problems, however, the next task is to determine whether we can
achieve a larger class of problems if we let the verifier interrogate the prover. This was the
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question asked in the mid-eighties [Babai, 1985; Goldwasser et al., 1985], and led us in to
the world of interactive proof systems.
Unfortunately, it’s not as simple as just requiring interaction. In the deterministic
setting, we remain in NP. The prover will always know what the verifier will ask, given
the input, and this will in turn mean that all the interaction can be collapsed into a single
message. We need one more powerful tool - randomness.
2.1.4 Interactivity and Randomness: IP
So far our verifier has simply been a machine that can run in polynomial time. We can vastly
increase the power of the verifier here by giving it access to randomness. This means now
the message the verifier sends no longer depends simply on x and the prover’s message,
but also on r1, some random choices of the verifier unknown to the prover. These random
choices stop the prover from knowing what it’s second message will be, and means that the
interactivity can’t be collapsed to a single message. This is the notion of interactive proofs
introduced in the eighties by Goldwasser et al. [1985], and will be the main overarching
model we use. The complexity class of problems that can be solved with an interactive
proof of k rounds is called IP(k).
The original model had the verifier generating private randomness, however it turns
out that the verifier’s random choices can be public and are still effectively as powerful, just
requiring an additional 2 rounds of interaction (Goldwasser and Sipser [1986]). Although
it’s worth noting that this statement doesn’t hold when we have streaming interactive proofs
[Chakrabarti et al., 2013].
It is important to note now we’ve added randomness, we’re no longer in the case
where the verifier always accepts a proof; we need to prepare for the possibility the verifier
could, by chance, reject a correct proof (the completeness error), or accept an incorrect
proof (the soundness error). Previously, when everything was deterministic, we required
these errors to be zero, but part of the power of randomness is allowing this probability of
failure. We can now define IP(k), and the following is the textbook definition of a k-round
interactive proof system [Arora and Barak, 2009].
Definition 1. A language L belongs to IP(k) if there is a k-round interactive proof system
to determine if x ∈ Lf in the following sense:
We have a probabilistic polynomial time Verifier, V , and a Prover, P , and both are
given the input x ∈ {0, 1}n. The verifier and prover will interact by sending a series of k
messages back and forth, producing a transcript t = Transcript(V, r, P, x), where r is the
private randomness the verifier uses.
After the interaction, the verifier will use t to determine whether it should accept
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or reject the claim x ∈ L. Let Out(V, r, P, x) be the output (accept, reject) of the verifier
using randomness r, interacting with P on input x.
We say the interactive proof system can determine if x ∈ L if the following two
properties hold:
Completeness There is a prover, P such that for each x ∈ L
P(Out(V, r, P, x) = accept) ≥ 2
3
Soundness For every x /∈ L, and every prover P’
P(Out(V, r, P ′, x) = accept) ≤ 1
3
The complexity class IP is the set of all languages with interactive proof systems.
This is the broadest definition of IP. An interesting observation by Furer et al.
[1989] is that we can have perfect completeness, P(Out(V, r, P, x) = accept) = 1, with-
out sacrificing the power of interactive proofs, although if we shifted to perfect soundness,
P(Out(V, r, P, x) = accept) = 0, we restrict ourselves back down to NP. An important
intuition to understand here is that an interactive proof system is sound if the verifier will
almost never accept a proof for an x /∈ L. The interactive proof is complete if the verifier
will almost always accept a correct proof that x ∈ L, and indeed, as mentioned, we can
upgrade this to always accepting without consequence.
2.2 IP = PSPACE: A Brief History of IPs
Before we delve into the modern era of streaming interactive proofs, we survey the work and
major results that have come out of the previous 35 years of IPs. As mentioned, it began
in MIT in the early 80’s with the paper ‘The knowledge complexity of Interactive Proof
Systems’ by Goldwasser et al. [1985]. The motivation of the paper was two fold, primarily
focusing on cryptographic applications, and secondly, on clarifying the idea of what proving
something really means. The former covered the introduction of zero knowledge proofs,
which we will be exploring in Chapter 5. The latter was the introduction of interactive
proofs. Their idea, as discussed in Definition 1, was that a theorem-proving procedure
should satisfy three conditions:
1. It’s possible to prove a true theorem.
2. It’s impossible to prove a false theorem.
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3. Communicating the proof should be efficient.
These ideas correspond to completeness, soundness and the verifier running in polynomial
time, as discussed.
Independent of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff, although published at the same
conference, the paper ‘Trading Group Theory for Randomness’ came from Babai [1985].
This paper introduced Arthur-Merlin games. The motivation behind this paper was some-
what different to GMR, Babai had been trying to prove a problem in group theory [Babai
and Szemerédi, 1984], specifically attempting to show the problem was in NP. He had
succeeded in his 1984 paper, conditional on an unproven group theory conjecture. Babai
introduces the classes AM[k], to describe Arthur Merlin games with k rounds of interac-
tion. In the language of GMR and IPs, AM[k] is the class of interactive proofs with k
rounds where Arthur (the verifier) speaks first and has public randomness, i.e., the verifier’s
randomness is known to all parties. The name Arthur-Merlin stems from the idea of the
all-powerful, although not necessarily trustworthy, wizard Merlin attempting to convince
the impatient King Arthur [Arturus, 1136]. Babai showed that the group theory problem
he was working on had a constant round IP, and furthermore proved that for constant k,
AM[k] =AM[2] [Babai and Moran, 1988].
Historically, at this point there were two types of interactive proofs, IPs from GMR
and Arthur-Merlin games from Babai. The class of problems solvable with interactive
proofs, IP, is the private randomness analogue of AM[poly], which are interactive proofs
with a polynomial number of rounds and public randomness. As we mentioned earlier, it
was shown shortly after the creation of these two classes that private randomness IPs can
be adapted to public randomness by adding two rounds, hence IP=AM[poly] [Goldwasser
and Sipser, 1986].
This is when interactive proofs really began to be interesting to computational com-
plexity scientists. In the GMR paper, the authors provide an IP for the quadratic residue
problem, which is well known to be in NP. The problem in Babai [1985] was for a problem
suspected of being in NP. The question of whether IP contained problems outside of NP
became a big goal in the world of theoretical computer science.
In 1986, Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson showed the well known problem of graph
non-isomorphism, which many people have failed to show is in NP, is in IP [Goldreich
et al., 1986]. The general consensus after this was that (zero knowledge) IP was likely a
slightly larger class than NP, but not much bigger. However in 1988 Fortnow and Sipser
tried to see if IP contained coNP, the set of decision problems whose no instance is check-
able in polynomial time [Fortnow and Sipser, 1988]. Unfortunately, they showed that in fact
to make a statement such as coNP⊂IP, one would need a non-relativising technique, i.e.
some new proof technique beyond ‘standard’ techniques using black boxes and reductions.
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This was a setback for the study of IP, however towards the end of 1989 a flurry of
work led to the result P#P ⊂ IP [Lund et al., 1992]. P#P is a large class of problems
that can be solved in polynomial time by an algorithm with access to a oracle that can solve
a problem in #P , which are the class of counting problems associated to problems in NP,
such as ‘How many subsets of a list of integers add up to zero?’. It had been proved that the
classP#P contained the polynomial hierarchy [Toda, 1991], so this was a major realisation
that the class IP covered a huge number of problems.
The next step was to show that IP=PSPACE, and indeed this was achieved by
Shamir [1992], using the techniques of Lund et al. [1992]. This result is a landmark in
the world of complexity theory, leading to possibly the most famous result in complexity,
the PCP Theorem.
The research following IP=PSPACE were shifting towards restricting the power of
the verifier. One such direction was that of Babai et al. [1991]. They showed that using
error-correcting code, i.e., giving the verifier query access to the error-corrected encoding
of the input, all problems in NP could be checked by a verifier in polylogarithmic time.
A similar direction restricted the number of queries the verifier could make to the
proof, as well as the randomness of the verifier. This concept is captured by a PCP, a
probabilistically checkable proof. The prover in this setting sends a gigantic message π ∈
{0, 1}poly(n), the verifier has r(n) random bits, and can form a satisfactory Out(V, r, P, x)
after reading at most q(n) bits of π. The languages for which this works form the complex-
ity class PCP[r(n), q(n)].
Studies of PCPs were accelerated by the results of Feige et al. [1991] that stated
NP⊂PCP[log(n) log(log(n)), log(n) log(log(n))]. This was followed by the proof that
NP⊂PCP[log(n), log(n)] achieved by Arora and Safra [1998]. The final result, known as
the PCP theorem was proved by Arora et al. [1998] and stated NP=PCP[log(n), O(1)].
This result says that any problem in NP can be checked by a verifier with log(n) random
bits, who only queries constantly many points of the prover’s message. This was massive
news in the complexity world, and stands today as one of the greatest results in computer
science, and even made it into the New York Times [1992]. For further overview of PCPs,
see the textbook of Arora and Barak [2009].
Since these results, work in interactive proofs has continued, albeit with less focus
on the theoretical side, and more on the practical side. A significant line of work with in-
teractive proofs has been on Zero Knowledge proofs, which we will study in Chapter 5,
although the vast amount of work in that area is outside the scope of this thesis. Another
significant line of work is the study of interactive proofs for a space-bounded streaming ver-
ifier. This is where our work fits in. In the next few sections we cover the vital definitions,
and then do a historical survey of SIPs.
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2.3 Interactive Proofs in the Streaming Setting
We now turn to looking at what happens if the verifier can’t actually store the input x. We
consider verifiers with sublinear space, and x ∈ {0, 1}n. This corresponds to the real-world
notion of streaming, where x could be a massive data stream, and the verifier wishes to
compute some function of x that is impossible to compute in the streaming model. For
Chapters 3 and 4 we continue to use a probabilistic polynomial time verifier, but restrict the
model further as now we’re dealing with languages the verifier can’t compute in sublinear
space in a streaming manner as well as in polynomial time.
2.3.1 Languages, Functions and Notation
In the SIP protocols we’ll be constructing, we will no longer be dealing with just binary
inputs. We allow inputs x ∈ Fnq , vectors made up of n elements of the finite field of size q,
for some prime q. When we originally discussed proving a statement, x ∈ {0, 1}n, we de-
fined it as checking that a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} satisfies f(x) = 1. This difference
is more of a subtlety; we are now wishing to confirm f(x) = y for x ∈ Fnq , y ∈ Fq and
f : Fnq → Fq. Furthermore, we will ultimately use functions f : Fnq → Fmq . We henceforth
will refer to proof systems to verify (x, y) ∈ Lf = {(x, y) : y = f(x)}. We will refer to
verifying ‘x ∈ Lf ’ as being equivalent to verifying (x, y) ∈ Lf = {(x, y) : y = f(x)},
as we can simply let the prover send y = f(x) at the start of the protocol, bundled with
whatever other messages it sends. The reason for introducing this notion now, as opposed
to before defining IP, is that the literature often restricts attention to Boolean functions. Our
work on general functions comes from our aim to achieve ‘practical’ interactive proofs for
common real-world problems.
2.3.2 Space Bounds and Streams
We will look into two different types of streaming interactive proofs: one round proofs and
multiple round proofs. Before delving into the differences, we will discuss what exactly we
mean by a streaming interactive proof.
Definition 2. The streaming model we use will be the one-pass turnstile streaming model.
Our inputs will be A ∈ Fnq , and this will arrive as a series of updates (δ, i) ∈ Fnq × [n].
Each update (δ, i) tells us to update Ai to Ai + δ. For the most part, we will effectively be
considering the stream to be a string of (Ai, i), where each update simply contains the ith
element. However, all our protocols will work in the one-pass turnstile streaming setting.
Note in our proofs, the verifier streams the entire input before interaction with the prover.
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We assume that the verifier has restricted space O(s), with s = log(n) log(q) or
√
n log(q) for example, and wishes to verify x ∈ Lf for x ∈ Fnq . We want to be able to
deal with functions f : Fnq → Fmq that can’t be solved in the verifier’s space, and we also
want to be able to deal with functions where the verifier can’t store f(x).
We will introduce the methods that allow for this in Section 2.5, but to start with
we deal with adapting Definition 1 to formally define SIPs. This definition comes predomi-
nantly from the work to establish ‘annotated data streams’ by Chakrabarti et al. [2009], with
the k-round extension coming from the works of Cormode et al. [2011] and Chakrabarti
et al. [2013], amongst others.
Definition 3. A language L belongs to SIP(k) if there is a k-round streaming interactive
proof system to determine if x ∈ L, defined as follows:
We have a probabilistic polynomial time Verifier, V , with space O(s) and a Prover,
P , and both are given the input x ∈ Fnq , however the verifier only has streaming access to
the input (See Definition 2). The verifier and prover will interact by sending a series of k
messages back and forth, producing a transcript t = Transcript(V, r, P, x), where r is the
randomness the verifier uses.
After the interaction, the verifier will use t to determine whether it should accept
or reject the claim x ∈ L. Let Out(V, r, P, x) be the output (accept, reject) of the verifier
using randomness r, interacting with P on input x.
We say the interactive proof system can determine if x ∈ L if the following two
properties hold:
Completeness There is a prover, P, such that for each x ∈ L
P(Out(V, r, P, x) = accept) = 1
Soundness For every x /∈ L, and every prover P’
P(Out(V, r, P ′, x) = accept) ≤ 1
3
The complexity class SIP is the set of all languages with interactive proof systems with
polylog verifier space and proof length.
This is almost identical to the definition of interactive proof systems. The verifier’s
reduction to O(s log(q)) space translates to the verifier keeping a summary of x, not x
in its entirety. It is also important to note that the summaries the verifier keeps are random
summaries, that is, the prover cannot know what is actually being kept. This is an interesting
parallel to previously mentioned PCPs. The PCP theorem tells us that for SIPs with the
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prover sending a single message (‘non-interactive streaming proofs’) where the verifier can
store the input, the verifier with O(log(n)) random bits and a constant number of queries
to the proof will be able to verify any problem in NP. This constant number of queries can
instead by thought of as a constant sized summary of the entire proof π, i.e., the verifier
views the entire proof, and keeps some summary of size O(1). This seems to be a more
powerful notion, however Gertner et al. [2002] shows this is in fact equivalent to the PCP
model. This idea of the prover sending a proof after the stream that the verifier can look
at, but is potentially larger than the verifier’s space, is called the Annotated Data Stream
Model.
2.3.3 Annotated Data Stream Model (Non-interactive SIPs)
In our protocols, we have a data stream S , which is observed by two parties, a ‘prover’ (P )
and a ‘verifier’ (V ). The data stream will usually be arranged as a sequence of n tuples
of elements, where each tuple typically defines an element of a larger structure, such as
a matrix or vector. Abstractly, the verifier wishes to compute some function on S, f(S),
with assistance from the prover. Typically, the prover will provide the value of f(S), along
with a proof of its correctness. This yields the Annotated Data Stream model, introduced
by Chakrabarti et al. [2009]. The definition of this model follows from the definition of
SIP(k) with k = 1, representing the one message (the annotation) from the prover after the
stream S . We formalize the model via the definition below.
Definition 4. We have a prover P , and a verifier V , with the aim of cooperating to compute
some function f(S) of the stream S. The prover provides a message MP (S) comprised of
f̂(S), the claimed value f(S), and an annotation MP which supports this claim according
to some pre-agreed structure. Define the output of V , OutV , that depends on the summary
the verifier made of the stream V(S), the proposed f̂(S), V ’s randomly chosen bits RV ,
and the prover’s message.
OutV (V(S), f̂(S),RV ,MP (S)) =
f̂(S) If V is convinced⊥ Otherwise.
A protocol is defined by the functions MP and OutV . We say that a protocol is complete if
∀S ∃P : P[OutV (V(S), f̂(S),RV ,MP (S)) = f(S)] = 1 (2.1)
The Verifier’s protocol is sound if
∀S ∀P ′,V(S)′ : P
[
OutV (V(S ′), f̂(S ′),RV ,MP
′
(S ′)) /∈ {f(S ′),⊥}
]
≤ 13
As in previous IP definitions this says that we seek protocols so that an honest
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prover (one who faithfully follows the protocol) can always persuade the verifier to accept
the correct answer, while a dishonest prover cannot persuade the verifier to accept an incor-
rect result with more than probability 13 . Our protocols allow this probability to be reduced
to an arbitrarily small value with minimal cost.
In order to show an annotated data streaming protocol works we need to show com-
pleteness and soundness. This is sufficient to check that our protocol will successfully do
what we want: verify the computation with a high probability of detecting a malicious
prover. For some problems trivial protocols will exist wherein the prover’s message is null,
and the verifier evaluates the function in full. For these we seek protocols whose costs for
the verifier are substantially lower than this. Ideally, the protocol should run in sublinear
memory space for the verifier, without the need for intensive computation and the message
should be as small as possible. Similarly, we seek protocols where the honest prover does
not have to do substantially more work than simply computing f(S). For our annotated
data stream protocols in Chapter 3, we focus primarily on memory space for the verifier
and the size of the proof, which we call the communication cost. We therefore primarily
will refer to our annotated data stream protocols using the following notation.
Definition 5. A (h,s)-protocol is a valid annotated data streaming protocol using a message
of size O(h) bits, and for a verifier with memory O(s) bits.
Of course, there are many other considerations, including runtime for the verifier
during the streaming, as well as the checking of the prover message, and the overheads for
the prover. These costs are our focus in Chapter 4.
2.4 Costs in Streaming Interactive Proofs
The costs we consider in subsequent chapters are communication and space costs, which
echo this topic’s origin in communication complexity. Prior work has developed the idea
of using interactive proofs to independently verify outsourced computations without dupli-
cating the effort. Recent work has sought to argue that interactive proofs can indeed be
practically used for verification. Modern research takes two main approaches, from highly
general methods with currently far-from-practical costs, to tackling specific fundamental
problems where the overhead of verification is negligible.
Chapters 3 and 4 both consider the ‘negligible overhead’ end of the spectrum and
study primitive computations within linear algebra – a core set of tools with applications
across engineering, data analysis and machine learning.
With streaming interactive proofs, we will consider the following costs.
Space Costs
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Verifier Memory The verifier’s working memory.
Communication The total communication between the two parties.
Interactivity The number of back and forth messages between the prover and verifier.
Computation Costs
Verifier Streaming Cost – The additional work the verifier does over the input.
Verifier Checking Computation – The verifier’s work for the interactive stage.
Prover Overhead – The additional work of the prover beyond solving the problem.
Our concern in Chapter 4 will be explore how useful interactivity is for SIPs.
Previous work in this field has often considered increasing interactivity in order
to reduce the two main concerns, verifier memory and communication. In Chapter 4 we
consider the natural metric of time taken, where we consider bandwidth, latency, and com-
putation time to create an aggregate measure. We examine this metric to determine the ideal
level of interactivity in the practical setting.
2.5 SIP Toolbox
We will now outline some of the most useful techniques in streaming interactive proofs.
These are the techniques that will be fundamental to all our results, and allow us to solve a
series of quintessential problems in interactive proofs, such as identity testing, polynomial
evaluation, and implicit function summation. To begin with, we will detail how we consider
finite fields.
In line with prior work, all our protocols rely on computations performed over finite
fields. For ease of implementation, we use prime fields. Given a prime q, the finite (prime)
field Fq is the set {0 . . . q − 1} with addition and multiplication modulo q. Hence, storing
field values requires O(log q) bits. We make use of the fact that in many cases arithmetic
in the field and arithmetic over the integers can be directly compatible. However, as we
consider more complicated computations, we encounter situations where we seek solutions
over the reals, which do not correspond to solutions in the field. To avoid this, we will use
scaling and rounding techniques to approximate using field values.
Specifically, one could consider the input to be fixed precision (ρ) rational numbers
which can be represented as members of the set Fρ,M = {x ∈ R ∩ [−M,M ] : bρx ∈ Z},
with respect to a base, b. We then choose the field size q as a function of ρ and M , in order
to allow us to maintain the exact correspondence between the field and the fixed precision
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rationals. We map y ∈ Fρ,M to y′ ∈ Fq, where y′ = xbρ mod q, choosing q to be a prime
bigger than (2M + 1)bρ.
2.5.1 Fingerprints
Fingerprints can be thought of as hash functions for large vectors and matrices with addi-









Similarly, for u ∈ Fnq we have the vector fingerprint





Lemma 1 tells us probability of two different vectors or matrices having the same fingerprint
(over the random choice of x) can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the field size, as
an almost immediate consequence of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Schwartz, 1980], with
the fingerprint application built from Rabin [1981].
Lemma 1 (Rabin [1981]). Given A,B ∈ Fn×nq and x ∈R Fq, we have




A similar result holds for F vecx . In our model, fingerprints can be constructed in
constant space (measured in field elements), and with computation linear to the input size.
2.5.2 Low Degree Extensions
Low degree extensions (LDEs) have been used extensively in interactive proofs. LDEs have
been used in conjunction with sum-check (Section 2.5.3) in a variety of contexts [Gold-
wasser et al., 2008; Cormode et al., 2011, 2012]. Formally, for a set of data S an LDE is a
low degree polynomial that goes through each data point. Typically, we think of S as being
laid out as a vector or d-dimensional tensor indexed over integer coordinates. This polyno-
mial can then be evaluated at a random point r with the property that, like fingerprinting,
two different data sets are unlikely to evaluate to the same value at r (inversely proportional
to the field size).
Given input as a vector u ∈ Fnq , we consider two new parameters, l and d with
n ≤ ld, and re-index u over [l]d. The d-dimensional LDE of u satisfies f̃u(k0, ..., kd−1) =
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uk for k ∈ [n] where k0...kd−1 is the base l representation of k. For a random point
r = (r0, ..., rd−1) ∈ Fdq , we have
















where χk is the Lagrange basis polynomial. Note that f̃u : Fdq → Fq and q ≥ l. A similar
definition can be used for a matrix A ∈ Fn×nq , by reshaping into a vector in Fn
2
q .
The polynomials can be evaluated over a stream of updates in space O(d) and time
(field operations) per update O(ld) (Cormode et al. [2011]). The time cost of our verifier to
evaluate an LDE at one location, r, is O(nld) (for sparse data, n can be replaced with the
number of non-zeros in the input).
2.5.3 Sum-Check Protocol
Our final tool is the sum-check protocol of Lund et al. [1992]. Sum-check is a multi-round









g(k0, k1, ..., kd−1) for g : Fdq → Fq. (2.4)
For our purposes, g will be a polynomial derived from the LDE of a dataset of size n = ld
(i.e. the d-dimensional tensor representation of the data), and each polynomial used in
the protocol will have degree λ, with λ = O(l); however, we keep the parameter λ for
completeness. Provided that all the checks are passed then the verifier is convinced that
(with high probability) the value G was as claimed in (2.4). The original descriptions of the
sum-check protocol [Lund et al., 1992; Arora and Barak, 2009] use l = 2, however we shift
to using arbitrary l, similar to Aaronson and Wigderson [2009] and Cormode et al. [2011,
2012]. The protocol goes as follows:
Stream Processing: V randomly picks r ∈ Fdq and computes g(r0, ..., rd−1).







g(k0, k1, ..., kd−1).
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V checks that G =
∑l−1
k0=0
g0(k0), computes g0(r0) and sends r0 to P .
...







g(r0, ..., rj−1, kj , ..., kd−1).
V checks if gj−1(rj−1) =
∑l−1
kj=0
gj(kj), computes gj(rj) and sends rj to P .
...
Round d: P sends gd−1 : Fq → Fq, where
gd−1(kd−1) = g(r0, ..., rd−3, rd−2, kd−1).
V checks that gd−2(rd−2) =
∑l−1
kd−1=0
gd−1(kd−1), computes gd−1(rd−1), and finally
checks this is g(r0, ..., rd−2, rd−1).
P can express the polynomial gj as a set Gj =
{
(gj(x), x) : x ∈ [λ + 1]
}
. In
each round V sums the first l elements of this set, and checks it is gj−1(rj−1) for j > 0,
then evaluates the LDE of Gj at rj , giving a computation cost per round of O(l + λ). The
verifier also has to do some work in the streaming phase, evaluating the function g at r, with
time cost O(nλd). The prover’s computation time comes from having to evaluate g at ld−j
points in the jth round, and so ultimately evaluating g at
∑d−1
j=1 l
d−j = O(n) points, with
a cost per point of O(λd) (we subsequently show how this can be reduced in our protocols
for linear algebra). The costs of performing sum-check are summarized as follows:
Communication O(λ) per round, for d rounds.
Prover costs O(nλd) time for computation.
Verifier costs O(d) memory cost,O(nλd) time to compute LDE and checking costO(d(l+
λ)).
Soundness and Completeness This protocol has perfect completeness, and a soundness
error of λd|F| .
In our implementations, we will optimize our methods to ‘stop short’ the sum-check
protocol and terminate at round d − 1 (this idea is implicit in the work of Aaronson and
Wigderson [Aaronson and Wigderson, 2009, Section 7.2]). In this setting, the verifier finds
the set
{g(r0, ..., rd−3, rd−2, kd−1) : kd−1 ∈ [l]}.
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in the stream processing stage, and then checks this against the claimed set of values pro-
vided by the prover in round d−1. This increases the space used by the verifier to maintain
these l LDE evaluations. However, this does not affect the asymptotic space usage of the
verifier, since we assume that V already keeps space proportional to l to handle P ’s mes-
sages. It does not affect the streaming overhead time; consider the ` LDE evaluations the
verifier must keep, each update affects only one LDE evaluation (the one with which it
shares the final coordinate). Equivalently, this can be viewed as running l instances of sum-
check in parallel on the data divided into l partitions. Hence, this appears as an all-round
improvement, at least in theory.
2.6 SIPs and Complexity Classes
Section 2.2 discussed the work that led up to a complete characterisation of polynomial-time
verifiers in interactive proofs. Unfortunately for SIPs, a similar result has not yet found. We
now investigate the history of SIPs, to give further context for our results, particularly in
Chapter 5 when we introduce ZK-SIPs. For more detailed insight into the history, Thaler
[2014] produced a survey of streaming verification algorithms. We will briefly recap this
here, highlighting the relevant work.
An important thing to begin with is that whilst, for our purposes, the concepts of
streaming interactive proofs were introduced by Chakrabarti et al. [2009] and Cormode
et al. [2011], these are not the first papers to consider space-bounded verifiers. Shortly after
the IP=PSPACE result Lipton and Condon [Condon, 1992; Condon and Lipton, 1989] gave
some classifications what could be solved by an IP with a space-bounded verifier. However,
their work considered verifiers with read-only access to the input, and then bounded work-
ing space. Our streaming setting is contained within this classification. In streaming the
input is read once sequentially, and this sequencing is critical to the difficulty of the prob-
lem. Other research with a similar space bound has been done with multiprover interactive
proofs, where there are several provers [Feige and Shamir, 1989; Tauman Kalai et al., 2013].
2.6.1 Annotations and Arthur-Merlin Games
The research of Chakrabarti et al. [2009] was the first to relate streaming annotations to
interactive proofs. We discussed this non-interactive SIP model in Section 2.3.3. Anno-
tated data streams are non-interactive, the prover sends a single message to the verifier.
Chakrabarti et al. [2009] also introduce the concept of a ‘prescient’ protocol. A prescient
SIP has the first message arrive at any time, before the verifier reads the input, or even inter-
leaved with the input. The counter to this is an ‘online’ SIP, where the message arrives after
the input (or more specifically, the message doesn’t contain information about any of the
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input the verifier is yet to see). A classic example of the difference between them would be
that of the INDEX problem. In this problem, the input is a stream A ∈ Fnq , followed by an
index j ∈ [n]. The verifier wishes to recover Aj . Alone, this would require linear space for
the verifier in the streaming setting. A prescient protocol would have the prover send j be-
fore the input, for a (log(q), log(q))−protocol. A lower for bound online (h, s)-protocols,
presented in Chakrabarti et al. [2009], shows that hs = Ω(n).
In Chakrabarti et al. [2009], and future works, the costs for online protocols are
shown using communication complexity lower bounds. This is a natural step in the world
of streaming. The relationship between communication and streaming [Alon et al., 1999]
allows us to use lower bounds from communication complexity to get lower bounds for the
storage space needed in a streaming algorithm. A streaming algorithm can be simulated by
several parties in a communication complexity setting. For INDEX, Alice would hold A,
and Bob would have j. The communication complexity would be the amount of memory
Alice must send to Bob in order for him to outputAj . This represents a streaming algorithm
where the input A is seen by the verifier, and the message from Alice to Bob would be the
memory state of the verifier after seeing A.
This is used to get the above lower bound for online protocols, through the intro-
duction of Online-MA communication. In this setting, we have three parties, Alice, Bob
and Merlin. Merlin is the prover and Alice and Bob represent the verifier, as before in the
INDEX setting, we have Alice holding A, Bob holding j. Alice and Merlin send a message
to Bob, and Bob must output Aj , or ⊥ if he thinks Merlin is dishonest. Chakrabarti et al.
[2013] studies this model and creates a ‘complexity zoo’ of several complexity classes that
can be built in this setting.
2.6.2 Tricks from IPs for SIPs
As mentioned in Section 2.2, IP research after IP=PSPACE and the PCP theorem continued
in a more practical direction. A major result in this direction was the remarkable GKR pro-
tocol of Goldwasser et al. [2008]. They introduced a protocol built around the sum check
protocol of Lund et al. [1992] that allowed a verifier to check an arithmetic circuit of poly-
nomial size and polylog depth using polylog space and communication, in polylog rounds.
This provided an efficient proof system for problems in the complexity class NC, that is,
problems solvable by efficient parallel algorithms. The arithmetic circuit used in the proto-
col is ‘log-space uniform’, meaning that a log-space algorithm can return the neighbours of
any given gates in the circuit.
This celebrated result was utilised by Cormode et al. [2011], who showed that the
GKR protocol could be used by a streaming verifier, and hence introduced the idea of
efficient powerful streaming interactive proofs. This result kick-started a flurry of activ-
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ity in SIPs, where several classes of problems, such as frequency moments and certain
graph problems, were given increasingly efficient protocols [Cormode et al., 2013, 2012;
Chakrabarti et al., 2013; Thaler, 2013]. It is here where our work in Chapter’s 3 and 4
reside. Our work is amongst other research efforts to give truly practical specialised SIPs
[Thaler, 2013; Chakrabarti and Ghosh, 2019; Chakrabarti et al., 2020a].
2.6.3 What can be done with a streaming interactive proof?
Whenever we have a model of computation, the natural question is to ask what it can do.
For many models, we use computational complexity classes to summarise the problems
they can solve. For example, NP is the class of problems that can be verified in polynomial
time, and PSPACE is the class of problems that can be solved with a polynomial amount of
space. As we saw in Section 2.2, this is equivalent to IP, the problems that can be verified
by a polynomial verifier with polynomial rounds of interaction.
These models are all similar; the verifier has read-only access to some input. This
is completely different from the streaming model in that the input can be read only once,
and the order of the input is vitally important to the difficulty of the task. Take the INDEX
problem, which has a stream A of length n, followed by an index j ∈ [n]. The problem
requires the streaming algorithm to returnAj . This is a very difficult problem requiring a lot
of space if j is the last thing to arrive, but a trivial problem if j arrives before A. However,
some classifications for streaming interactive proofs have been made.
An important distinction to make is that of communication complexity classes and
computational complexity classes. The above classes are computational complexity classes,
but for streaming problems, we shift to the idea of communication complexity.
The communication complexity of a problem f(x, y), introduced by Yao [1979],
is the amount of communication between Alice holding x and Bob holding y, in order for
Bob to produce f(x, y). In the earlier INDEX problem, x is A, and y is j, and they want to
solve f(x, y) = Aj . This is an interesting analogue to streaming introduced by Alon et al.
[1999]. Consider a streaming algorithm for INDEX as earlier, the stream begins with A, and
ends with j, and the streaming algorithm wishes to output Aj . The amount of space this
algorithm needs is exactly the communication complexity of the above problem. Consider
the streaming algorithm S, after viewing A, its memory state will be some s1. It then views
j and needs to output Aj . This memory state s1 is equivalent to the message Alice would
send to Bob. For further reading on this aspect, the textbook of Rao and Yehudayoff [2020]
has a good summary of recent results.
Relating this to streaming interactive proofs, as was done in Chakrabarti et al.
[2013], we see that to replicate the interaction between a prover and a verifier, we can
relate this to a multiparty communication complexity problem. The results of Chakrabarti
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et al. [2013] cover several communication complexity classes that arise when considering
constant-round streaming interactive proofs. The paper produces several interesting results,
including a lower bound for streaming INDEX that we will see in Chapter 5. Furthermore,
it is shown that the hierarchical classes of problems solvable by a k-round SIP collapses at
k = 4, that is any constant-round protocol using more than 4 rounds is no more powerful
than a 4-round SIP (up to polynomial blow ups in cost).
As we will discuss at the end of Chapter 5, these results are only for constant round
SIPs. There are some classifications for logarithmic round SIPs and beyond, but a compre-
hensive study of these has yet to be done.
One large set of problems that are known to be solvable by polylog-round SIPs
is log-space uniform NC [Goldwasser et al., 2008; Cormode et al., 2012]. These are the
problems that can be represented a by a log-space uniform arithmetic circuit. We define
SIP as the class of problems that can be solved by a log space verifier engaging in a log-
round protocol with polylog communication. However, extensions of what are possible
with SIPs are largely unstudied, and we will discuss conjectures in this area in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
Non-Interactive Proofs for Data
Analysis
This chapter is formed from the 2018 AISTATS paper “Cheap Checking for Cloud Com-
puting: Statistical Analysis via Annotated Data Streams” written by Graham Cormode and
Chris Hickey.
3.1 Motivation
The massive leap in popularity of machine learning techniques can be attributed in part not
simply to novel algorithms, but also to dramatic increases in scale: much larger models with
many parameters to set optimally, and much larger training data sets to determine these pa-
rameters. However, this presents a challenge to data owners who do not have a convenient
data centre at their disposal. The size of data and computational cost in order to extract ac-
curate models begins to look prohibitive. At the same time, a potential answer has emerged,
in the form of outsourced computation. That is, instead of building the infrastructure needed
to store and analyse large quantities of data, computation can be ‘rented’ on demand. Ini-
tially cloud offerings provided only the barebones of a remote system, but current options
provide many tools, libraries and algorithms available to take “off the shelf”.
One doubt remains. If we send data off to the cloud, and request some analysis to be
performed, what guarantee do we get that the processing has been done to our satisfaction?
The provider has an economic incentive to cut corners: to perform the computation on only
a sample of provided data, or to terminate an iterative parameter search before convergence
has occurred, for example. Such short cuts yield plausible but suboptimal models. So how
could we be assured that the best model has been found, without repeating the computation
ourself or having multiple providers repeat the work, substantially driving up costs?
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In this chapter, we adopt the annotated data streams approach (Section 2.3.3) for
verifying the models founded by an outsourced provider. Rather than repeating all or some
of the computation, we instead provide protocols in which the cloud also provides some ex-
tra information that allows us to check a strict adherence to the required computation. The
overhead for the cloud provider is minimal – often, the required information is a relatively
low cost function of the input data or natural by-products of the target computation. These
do not restrict the cloud to use any particular implementation or algorithm; just that they
demonstrate that the output meets certain necessary properties. The key part of these proto-
cols is that the information required is very easy for the original data owner to check, based
on appropriately defined fingerprints of the input. These fingerprints can be computed flex-
ibly and incrementally from the input as it arrives in any order, so the data owner does not
even need to retain a complete copy of the input. The overhead for the data owner is there-
fore low: it is typically dominated by the cost of sending the data to the cloud and receiving
the output of the computation. If the data owner’s checks pass, then they are assured that
the computation has been performed by the cloud satisfactorily, with a very high degree
of certainty. One can then think of these protocols as providing effective “checksums for
computation”.
As discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3.3, work on annotated data streams
draws on the theory of Interactive Proofs. This model was developed in the early 1990s as
an alternate perspective on computational complexity. An early celebrated result was that
the set of computations that could be effectively checked by a “weak” verifier corresponded
exactly to the powerful class of computations that could be performed using polynomial
space (PSPACE) [Babai, 1985; Goldwasser and Sipser, 1986; Lund et al., 1992; Shamir,
1992]. Such results were initially thought to be of purely theoretical interest. A decade
ago [Goldwasser et al., 2008], this topic was revisited from a perspective closer to our own:
to what extent could arbitrary programs be checked without fully repeating them? Several
strong models were proposed, allowing a large class of computations to be checked in this
way. However, the costs were still typically large: programs have to be compiled into non-
standard formats (such as circuits with gates performing arithmetic operations), and the
overheads for the cloud can be very substantial, often hundreds or even millions of times
slower than directly performing the computation.
We break away from this paradigm, and achieve protocols that have minimal over-
heads by deliberately narrowing the scope of the computations considered. By focusing on
a collection of important tasks in machine learning based on linear algebra, we can provide
bespoke protocols based on ‘fingerprinting’ the input data that take advantage of specific




We begin with primitives for ubiquitous steps in data analysis: matrix multiplication and
inversion, Cholesky decomposition and eigenvalue finding (Section 3.2). In Section 3.3, we
present applications of these to tasks of interest: regression, principal component analysis,
and linear discriminant analysis. These core tasks are sufficient to show the power of this
paradigm. We provide empirical validation of our claims in Section 3.4.
This work represents some first steps in verifying outsourced computation of ma-
chine learning. The next steps are to extend this work to more complex models and al-
gorithms currently enjoying popularity in machine learning, such as deep learning and be-
yond. Since, at the risk of drastic oversimplification, almost all of machine learning can
be performed via numerical data encodings (vectors, matrices and tensors) combined with
optimization, we are optimistic that the foundations laid in this work will naturally extend
to further protocols for common mining and modelling tasks.
3.1.2 Related Work
As an extension to the discussion in Section 2.3, we briefly survey the most related work
in this area. Chakrabarti et al. [2009] introduced the annotated streams model and provided
protocols for frequency moments in data streams, and several graph problems, including
triangle counting, connectivity and bipartite matchings. They also introduced a square
matrix multiplication protocol extending the classical result of Freivalds [1979]. Subse-
quently, Cormode et al. [2013] and Chakrabarti et al. [2020b] provided further protocols
for graph problems, using linear and integer programs to validate optimal matchings and
shortest paths. More recently, Daruki et al. [2015] extended results on matrix analysis,
provided more general protocols for matrix multiplication, and a protocol for eigenvalue
(but not eigenpair) checking. For matrices A ∈ Fk×nq and B ∈ Fn×k
′
q , they show an
(kk′h log(q), v log(q))−protocol, where hv ≥ n. These protocols are used to perform
shape fitting and clustering, although they shift away from annotated data streams and to-
wards an interactive proof model which allows several exchanges of messages between
helper and verifier. The annotated data stream model is generalized by definitions of stream-
ing interactive proofs (SIPs) [Cormode et al., 2011, 2012]. As mentioned in Section 2.3.3,
note that annotated data stream verification protocols can be considered as single message
SIPs.
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3.2 Linear Algebraic Checks
In this section, we define protocols for checking a variety of linear algebraic primitives,
based on careful use of fingerprints. We use the notation A→i to denote the ith row of the
matrix A, and A↓i to denote the ith column of A.
In many of the protocols, we will stream in a matrix, and then receive the matrix
again from the helper, and we want to know whether or not these matrices are the same. This
is the EQUALITY problem. The following almost immediate extension of Lemma 1 allows
us to check with high probability that two streamed matrices are identical (EQUALITY).




-protocol for EQUALITY on A ∈ Fn×mq .
Proof. To prove that this primitive works, we need to show that it satisfies completeness
and soundness. These follow fairly immediately from Lemma 1. If A = Ã the verifier
will always accept, and if A 6= Ã then the verifier will be tricked by a malicious prover
with probability 1 − nm−1q . The costs involved are O(log(q)) for the verifier’s space cost,





Input : A ∈ Fn×mq
Output: Verification that the Prover sent A
Verifier
Choose x ∈R F
Stream in A and compute Fx(A)
Prover
Send Ã claiming Ã = A
Verifier
Receive Ã and compute Fx(Ã)
Check
Fx(A) = Fx(Ã)
3.2.1 Fingerprinting the Gramian Matrix
We first show how to efficiently build a fingerprint of the Gramian matrix G = ATA given
a stream that specifies A (GRAMIAN MATRIX). Recall for p, q ∈ Fmq the outer product of
p⊗ q is pqT , so (p⊗ q)ij = piqj .
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Hence, we can compute the fingerprint of ATA from A row-by-row and summing
the product of row vector fingerprints. This immediately implies a protocol to verify that a
matrix G provided by the prover is the Gramian: simply use the above identity to compute
fx(A
TA) from the stream, and check that this is equal to fx(G).
Proposition 2. There is a
(
m2 log(q), n log(q)
)
-protocol for GRAMIAN MATRIX on A ∈
Fn×mq (Algorithm 2).
Proof. The protocol is outlined in Algorithm 2. As in Proposition 1, soundness and com-
pleteness follow immediately from properties of fingerprints in Section 2.5.1. The commu-
nication cost of m2 log(q) comes from the prover sending G. The verifier needs to keep n
intermediate fingerprints of each row in this protocol. Note that if the matrix A arrives in
row major format, the verifier’s space requirement will be O(log(q)).
As mentioned in the proof, the verifier runs in O(log(q)) if the matrix A arrives in
row major format, i.e. the first row appears first, then the second, and so on. A fundamental
part of our improvements follow from this notion. Given that the prover is already send-
ing ATA, the communication is O(m2 log(q)), and for a sacrifice of nm log(q) additional
communication, the verifier can request that the prover also sends A in row major format,
if the original stream of A wasn’t.
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Corollary 1. There is a
(
(m2 + nm) log(q), log(q)
)
-protocol for GRAMIAN MATRIX on
A ∈ Fn×mq (Algorithm 3).
Proof. The soundness and completeness hold as in Proposition 2. The extension here is the
two stage check that A = Ã and then that G = ÃT Ã.
Algorithm 2:
(
m2 log(q), n log(q)
)
GRAMIAN MATRIX (sublinear polyno-
mial space)
Input : A ∈ Fn×mq
Output: Verification that the Prover sent G = ATA ∈ Fm×mq
Verifier
Choose x ∈R F



























Matrix multiplication has been considered in prior work on annotated streaming. Daruki
et al. [2015] showed that any protocol for this problem must have the product of the com-
munication cost and space cost at least Ω((k + k′)n). Our protocol achieves this lower
bound up to logarithmic factors (noting that any protocol which reports (AB) requires
Ω(kk′) communication for this step). The previous best rectangular matrix multiplication
protocol, achieved by Daruki et al. [2015], was a
(
kk′h log(q), v log(q)
)
-protocol for any
hv ≥ n, that used the inner product protocol of Chakrabarti et al. [2009]. Our protocol
can be understood as setting v = 1, but removing the high overhead factor of n from the
communication cost in this case. Chakrabarti et al. [2009] does provide a square matrix
multiplication protocol with costs equivalent to our protocol, with n = k = k′.
We generalize the previous protocol to solve matrix multiplication. Given two ma-
trices, A ∈ Fk×nq and B ∈ Fn×k
′
q , an extension of Lemma 2 where we replace A
T → A














(m2 + nm) log(q), log(q)
)
GRAMIAN MATRIX (log space)
Input : A ∈ Fn×mq
Output: Verification that the Prover sent G = ATA ∈ Fm×mq
Verifier
Choose x ∈R Fq
Stream in A, compute Fx(A)
Prover
Send G claiming G = ATA, then ∀i ∈ [n] send Ã→i
Verifier
Receive G and compute Fx(G)
Initialise Fx(ÃT Ã) = 0
For Ã→i
Fx(Ã


















Equation (3.1) allows for an efficient matrix multiplication protocol, where the only addi-
tional work of the prover is to repeat the input matrices in a convenient order, as in Al-
gorithm 3. To find the fingerprint of AB we need to see each column of A and row of B










. The verifier uses fingerprints
to check that the reordered versions ofA andB agree with the versions present in the stream
S, and that the claimed matrix product ÃB has the same fingerprint as the fingerprint com-
puted via (3.1). Note again that if the verifier has control over the stream that will define A
andB, and can make it arrive as it appears inMP , then it can immediately store Fx(AB) as
required to apply the EQUALITY protocol (Algorithm 1) to determine whether the claimed
product ÃB = A ·B.
Theorem 1. There is a
(
(k′k + kn+ k′n) log(q), log(q)
)
-protocol for verifying matrix
multiplication with A ∈ Fk×nq , B ∈ Fn×k
′
q .
Proof. Algorithm 4 shows the matrix multiplication algorithm in detail. The verifier will
keep a fingerprint of A and B, in order to be able to check consistency with the sent Ã and
B̃. The prover sends ÃB claiming it to be AB, and the verifier fingerprints it. The verifier
now needs to confirm that ÃB = AB, which it will do using (3.1). When the prover sends
the columns of Ã and rows of B̃, the verifier simultaneously forms the fingerprints both
these matrices, and the product matrix ÃB̃. The checks at the end follow the logic that if,
with high probability, Ã = A and B̃ = B, then ÃB̃ = ÃB = AB.
The communication costs comes from sending A, B and AB, which gives us the
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(k′k + kn + nk) log(q). The verifier only stores a handful of fingerprints, hence the
O(log(q)) memory requirement.
Algorithm 4: MATRIX MULTIPLICATION
Input : A ∈ Fk×nq , B ∈ Fn×k
′
q
Output: Verification the helper sent AB
Verifier
Choose x ∈R Fq
Stream in A and B, compute Fxk′ (A), Fx(B)
Prover








Receive ÃB and compute Fx(ÃB)












































: i ∈ [n]
}
as we stream A and B. This will avoid the O
(
(k′n + nk) log(n)
)
communication cost of
sending A and B again, however the verifier needs space O(n log(q)). Our protocols will
largely be based on the algorithm for Theorem 1 as this is the most versatile regarding the
arbitrary input stream, and requires the least space from the verifier, which is often the bot-
tleneck in SIPs. Additional informal justification, which we delve into deeper in Chapter 4,
would be to consider the real life situation of multiplying two large matrices. If we have two
1000 × 1000 64-bit matrices, storing 1000 fingerprints requires 8 kilobytes, versus stor-
ing only a handful of bytes for a single fingerprint; on the other hand, the communication
cost will be 8 megabytes for the verifier with the larger memory space, and 24 megabytes
with the smaller memory space. We argue the thousand-fold memory saving versus the
three-fold communication sacrifice lends favour to the low-space verifier protocol.
Corollary 2. There is a
(
k′k log(q), n log(q)
)
-protocol for verifying matrix multiplication
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with A ∈ Fk×nq , B ∈ Fn×k
′
q .
When our input matrices are constituted of fixed precision rationals, we choose q as
follows:
Corollary 3. Given A ∈ Fk×nρ,M and B ∈ F
n×k′




choose q > n(2M + 1)222ρ so that the product can be represented exactly in the field.
Choosing q to be this large means that when we move A and B from Fρ,M to
Ã, B̃ ∈ Fq by multiplying by 2ρ, and then compute ÃB̃ all these values remain in Fq, and
by scaling back down by a factor of 22ρ we get our result in the desired format, without
wraparound or rounding errors. The memory required to store elements of Fq is log(q) =
O(log(M) + log(b)ρ), which is proportional to the space required to store the original
matrices in Fρ,M is log(M) + log(b)ρ.
Lower bounds on computing matrix fingerprints. The verifier needs very little memory










: i ∈ [n]
}
More generally, we would like to be able to find Fx(AB) from just Fx(A) and Fx(B),
without requiring the helper to repeat these. This would reduce communication and simplify
the protocol; however, we show this is not possible.
Theorem 2. Any function g with Fx(AB) = g(Fx(A), Fx(B)) for A,B ∈ Fn×nq requires
that fingerprints Fx are at least Ω(n) bits in size.
Proof. We make use of a hard problem from communication complexity to show the space
lower bound. In the DISJOINTNESS problem, two players Alice and Bob each have a bit
string, a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, and they wish to see whether for any i ∈ [n] they have ai = bi = 1.
If we had a function Fx : Fn×nq → Fq they could create n × n matrices A and B with a
and b on the diagonals and 0’s elsewhere. Then Alice could send Bob Fx(A), Bob could
compute Fx(B), and then find Fx(AB) using g. Observe thatAB = 0 iff strings a and b are
disjoint, and is non-zero otherwise. So by comparing Fx(AB) to Fx(0), we can determine
the answer to the disjointness problem. The fingerprints must be at least Ω(n) bits from the
corresponding communication complexity of DISJOINTNESS [Yao, 1979].
3.2.3 Eigenvalue Check
We next wish to verify the eigenpairs of a symmetric matrix A, i.e. a matrix such that
∀i, j, Aij = Aji. We wish to find pairs (λi, vi), for all i ∈ [n], such that A acts on each of
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the vectors by only scaling them by λi and that the vectors are orthonormal, i.e.
Avi = λivi v
T
i vj = δij =
0 i 6= j1 i = j
However, there is the major problem that (λi, vi) are real, potentially irrational numbers,
and we are working with finite precision (i.e. over a finite field). For this and subsequent
problems, we need to apply scaling and rounding, as mentioned earlier. There is a tension
here, since matrix computations can include values which are very large compared to the
input values. We also need to ensure that our approximation tolerance always allows an
honest helper to find a satisfying answer, but prevents a dishonest helper from getting a
wildly wrong answer accepted.
Prior study on eigenvalue checking has been done by Cormode et al. [2013]. The
following results are our study on the eigenpair problem, but follow largely the same strate-
gies, and get largely the same results, as those in Cormode et al. [2013].
Mapping these eigenpairs to the finite field can be delicate, since they may not align
with coordinates in the field. Our protocol relies on an integer scaling factor T , which
is used to multiply up values from the original domain. The field size q must grow by a
corresponding factor to accommodate the large range of values. To tolerate this, we relax to
allow approximate eigenvectors as defined below. We first show that rounding to the scaled
field FTq is always possible. Consider a particular eigenvector vi, and write v̂i = Tvi + r












and λ̂i ∈ FqT .
Note that when we scale up these eigenpairs, we also must scale up A. If we were simply
scaling up perfectly, so we could exactly represent our eigenpairs in the field, hence r = 0




The following theorem shows that a “rounded” eigenpair does indeed continue to act like
an eigenpair, and the error is quantifiable by the verifier. This theorem has error bounds




ij , which can be calculated by
the verifier by requesting A from the prover atomically, and checking consistency with
fingerprints.
Theorem 3. For symmetric A ∈ Fn×nq if {(λi, vi) : i ∈ [n]} are the eigenpairs of A with
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approximated eigenpairs using scaling factor T ∈ N;








, v̂i ∈ FnqT








, λ̂i ∈ FqT
then






















Proof. Using the following bounds:










And for arbitrary vectors x, y ∈ Fn and matrices X ∈ Fn×n:
‖x‖∞ ≤ ‖x‖2 ‖Xx‖2 ≤ ‖X‖2‖x‖2 ‖X‖2 ≤ ‖X‖F |xT y| ≤ ||x||2||y||2
We can then expand out the maximum norm on these vectors to show the bounds for the
Theorem, using as well the fact that Avi = λivi and vTi vj = δij .
‖TAv̂i − λ̂iv̂i‖∞ ≤ ‖TAv̂i − λ̂iv̂i‖2
= ‖T 2Avi + TAr − T 2λivi − Tρvi − Tλir − ρr‖2


























|v̂iT v̂j − T 2δij | ≤ |v̂iT v̂j − T 2δij |
≤ |(Tvi + r)T (Tvj + r)− T 2δij |
≤ |TvTi r + TrT vj + rT r|








These bounds show how the error scales with the scaling factor T . To better inter-
pret this, we next show that this error can be made arbitrarily small by increasing T .
Theorem 4. If we have

























where EA,n(T ) is a function of T dependent on n and A with EA,n(T )→ 0 as T →∞.















∣∣∣v̂iT v̂i − T 2∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣‖v̂i‖22 − ∣∣T 2∣∣∣∣




(as T will be large), we obtain the bound























As A is symmetric, we can write A = V DV T , where V is the orthogonal matrix of eigen-
vectors, and D is the diagonal matrix of corresponding eigenvalues.
‖TAv̂i − λ̂iv̂i‖∞ ≥
1√
n
















































So if we have a desired error ε > 0, and wish to ensure that there is a (true) eigenvalue
ε-close to the approximate eigenvalue, minj(|Tλj−λ̂i|)T < ε, we need to ensure we can pick a
T s.t. EA,n(T )−ε. As T tends to infinity, this bound positively approaches 0, as ||A||F and
n are independent of T , we can always choose a T so the O(T 2) denominator sufficiently
dominates the O(T ) numerator.
This means that if we want to find eigenvalues within certain error ε, we simply have











. It’s worth noting that the verifier
can use the prover to compute ‖A‖F by having the prover repeat A element-by-element,
and can check the same matrix is sent using fingerprinting, and compute the norm in order
to determine the scaling factor. This extra step doesn’t affect the asymptotic costs, and we
do not include it in Algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 5: SYMMETRIC EIGENSOLVER
Input : A ∈ Fn×nq , symmetric, ε > 0
Output: Verification the prover sent eigenpairs with ε precision
Verifier
Choose x ∈R F
Stream in A and compute Fx(A), ‖A‖F





and send to P









Whilst receiving (TA−D)V and V TV









































for finding the eigenvalues of a symmetric matrix A ∈ Fn×nq to a precision of ε > 0.
Proof. The protocol is laid out in Algorithm 5. The verifier can compute ‖A‖F and a fin-





, and send this to the
prover. The prover provides the claimed scaled matrices of (approximate) eigenvectors V
and corresponding eigenvalues D We then make use of the matrix multiplication protocol
to compute (TA−D)V . If the eigenvectors were exact, this would be 0; since they are ap-









(computed over the reals and rounded to the finite field), and can verify that each entry of
the product satisfies this bound. We also need to check that the eigenvectors are (almost)






. Thus we need
two invocations of the matrix multiplication protocol, evaluated over a sufficiently large fi-
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nite field. Setting T according to the above bounds gives the claimed costs. Note that when
we say ‘Run’ in the pseudocode of Algorithm 5, we are always running another annotated
streaming protocol, the verifier is never sending a message, and these protocols continue to
be non-interactive.
Once again, we consider the consequences of our input being A ∈ Fn×nρ,M , and
choose the value of q as follows
Corollary 4. Given A ∈ Fn×nρ,M and desired precision ε, our matrices V and D are in
Fn×n
2ρ′,nM2
, where ρ′ = max{ρ,− log ε}. Therefore, to keep a direct correspondence between
verification done in the field, and our real values, we choose q > n2(2M + 1)222ρ
′
.
This value of q is determined by the matrix multiplication step, and the fact that the
largest possible eigenvalue of A is bounded by n||A||max, where ||A||max is M .
3.2.4 Matrix Inversion
For matrix inversion we again scale the field by an integer factor T . Over this expanded
field, given an n × n matrix A, the prover wants to find a matrix B such that AB = TI .
To allow for rounding, we can relax the requirement of exact equality, and instead seek
a matrix B that acts approximately like an inverse. We first show that such a matrix is
guaranteed to exist. In order to do this, we consider the the condition number of our input,
κ(A) = ||A−1||2 · ||A||2. We need our problems to be well-conditioned (i.e. a low condition
number).
Lemma 3. For an invertible A ∈ Fn×nq , the prover can find a matrix B ∈ Fn×nqT satisfying
||AB − TI||max ≤ Tε (3.2)
if T ≥ n
2κ(A)
2ε and ε > 0
Proof. Consider the true inverse of A computed over the reals, A−1. Then we can define
B = TA−1 + E so that B ∈ Fn×nqT and ∀i, j and |Ei,j | ≤
1
2 . We can then map the entries
of B directly into the field FTq. We then have
‖AB − TI‖max ≤ ‖AE‖2 ≤ 12n
2‖A‖max
That is, the error is at most n
2κ(A)
2T . However, we need B ∈ F
n×n
qT , so we need to ensure
T is sufficiently large to deal with the maximum entry in A−1. A−1 can contain very
large values, depending on the condition number κ(A) = ||A−1||2 · ||A||2. Since ||A||2 ≥
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Algorithm 6: INVERT MATRIX
Input : A ∈ Fn×nq , ε, κ(A)
Output: Verification the helper sent B approximating A−1 with ε precision
Verifier
Choose x ∈R F
Stream in A and compute fx(A), ‖A‖max
Pick T > n
2κ(A)






‖AB − TI‖max ≤ 12n
2‖A‖max
||A||max, we see that
κ(A) = ||A||2||A−1||2 ≥ ||A||max||A−1||max
So, given a bound on κ(A), we choose a field large enough to represent κ(A)||A||max ≥ ||A
−1||max.
For this theorem, and several involving this new matrix inversion protocol, we hence con-
sider the condition number in our scaling factor size. The algorithm requires the condition
number as an input, which is unfortunate, but is a regular issue in numerical linear algebra.
We can set the parameter T to be as large as needed to make this error value some small ε,
so set it to be T > n
2κ(A)
ε .













to invert an invertible matrix A ∈ Fn×nq with the above criteria, (3.2).
Proof. The protocol is based on the above Lemma: we require the helper to provide such a
matrix B under the extended field FTq, along with the claimed value of AB. We then run
the above protocol for matrix multiplication, and check that each entry of AB meets the
required size bound. This ensures that the required condition on entries is met. The cost
of storing the fingerprints is O(log(nqκ(A)/ε)), and the communication costs come from
sending B over FTq, which is O(n2 log(nqκ(A)/ε)).
In the case that the matrix is singular, the helper could demonstrate this by showing
that there is an eigenvalue of A that is 0 to our precision.
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3.2.5 Cholesky Decomposition
If we have a positive semi-definite matrix A ∈ Fn×nq , the Cholesky Decomposition of A
involves finding a lower triangular matrix L ∈ Rn×n, with A = LLT . As before, we seek
an approximate answer, L̂ ∈ Fn×nqT .

















-protocol to find L̂ ∈ Fn×nqT
satisfying
||L̂L̂T − T 2A||max ≤ T 2ε
Proof. The protocol has the helper provide L̂ ∈ Fn×nqT in order, and the helper executes the
matrix multiplication protocol. It is straightforward to check that L̂ is lower triangular as
it is presented. We also know, from the numerical stability of the Cholesky decomposition
[Trefethen and Bau III, 1997], that the values in L are subject to the same blow-up that can
only be as much as
√







‖L̂L̂T − T 2A‖max ≤ ‖TLET + TELT + EET ‖2
≤ 2T‖L‖2‖E‖2 + ‖E‖22
≤ Tn
3
2 ‖A‖F + n
2
4






. Picking T ≥ 2n
3
2 ‖A‖F /ε suffices for
any given ε (since ‖A‖F ≥ 1). Via the matrix multiplication protocol, we just check




and memory cost of log( qn
3
2 ‖A‖F
ε ), as claimed.
3.2.6 Symmetric Generalised Eigenvalues
The Cholesky Decomposition allows us to solve the symmetric generalised eigenvalue prob-
lem for A,B ∈ Fn×nq , with A symmetric, and B symmetric positive semi-definite:
Find V,D ∈ Rn×n such that AV = BVD
The prover can do this by finding the Cholesky Decomposition of B = LLT . Then the
prover can find the eigenvalues of the symmetric matrix C = L−1AL−T to get matrices
V ′, D′ with L−1AL−TV = CV ′ = V ′D′. We set V = L−TV ′ and D = D′ to see
L−1AL−TV ′ = V ′D′ =⇒ L−1AV = LTV D =⇒ AV = BVD
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Algorithm 7: CHOLESKY DECOMPOSITION
Input : Positive semi-definite A ∈ Fn×nq , ε
Output: Verification the helper sent L̂ approximating the lower triangular L
with ε precision such that A = LLT
Verifier
Choose x ∈R F
Stream in A and compute fx(A), ‖A‖F
Pick T > 2n
3
2 ‖A‖F












Check For i < j
L̂ij = 0
Whilst receiving L̂L̂T and Â





Theorem 8. There is a streaming annotated (n2 log(qT ), log(qT ))-protocol with T =
κ(B)q2n4/ε for verifying V̂ , D̂ ∈ Fn×nqT approximately solving the generalised eigenvalue
problem for A ∈ Fn×nq symmetric, and B ∈ Fn×nq symmetric positive semi-definite:
AV = BVD
with ε the maximum absolute error between D̂ and D.
Proof. The Cholesky Decomposition allows us to solve the symmetric generalised eigen-
value problem for A,B ∈ Fn×nq , with A symmetric, and B symmetric positive semi-
definite;
Find V,D ∈ Rn×n such that AV = BVD
The prover can do this by finding the Cholesky Decomposition ofB, L and then performing
finding the eigenvalues of the symmetric matrix C = L−1A(L−1)T to get matrices V ′, D′
with CV ′ = V ′D′. D = D′, and V = L−1V ′ are the solutions we desire.
With our approximations, we use our matrix inversion and Cholesky Decomposition proto-
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From an honest prover, we receive approximate eigenpairs, Û , D̂ with diagonal λ̂, of Ĉ
from the helper, with scaling factor T giving error εδ, satisfying




















Let Dδ, U δ ∈ Rn×n be the true eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Ĉ, So
ĈU δ = U δDδ.
We know that ‖TDδ − D̂‖max will be at most Tεδ. Furthermore let L̂TV δ = U δ, so
ĈU δ = U δDδ
(̂L̂)−1A(̂L̂)−1
T
L̂TV δ = L̂TV δDδ
L̂(̂L̂)−1A(̂L̂)−1
T
L̂TV δ = L̂L̂TV δDδ
(T1I + E2)A(T1I + E2)

















By using the eigenvalue perturbation theory of Trefethen and Bau III [1997], we can say

















































∥∥AET2 ∥∥2 + ∥∥E2ET2 ∥∥2 + ∥∥λδiE1∥∥2
T 21
































































2‖B‖2‖A‖2 + 8n3‖A‖2 + 16n4‖B‖22 + 8‖B‖Fn5 + n6 + 8‖Ĉ‖2n2‖B‖2
T 21
As, A,B ∈ Fq, we have ‖A‖2, ‖B‖2 ≤ qn, ‖Ĉ‖2 ≤ qnT1
|λi − λδi | ≤














If we have that q ≥ 20, n ≥ 3 and T1 ≥ n2κ(B). We also have
|Tλδi − λ̂i| ≤ Tεδ
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Where εδ < ε.





















With the primitives outlined above, we can construct protocols for several common statisti-
cal analysis tasks.
3.3.1 Ordinary Least Squares
We first consider ordinary least squares regression (OLS), where we aim to find the optimal
linear relationship between a data set X and a set of observations y.
Definition 6. Let S = 〈{y1, X1}, ..., {yn, Xn}〉 where yi ∈ Fq is an observation of the set
of d predictors Xi ∈ Fdq . If we define X ∈ F
n×(d+1)
q with the i’th row being [1 Xi], OLS
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Algorithm 8: SYMMETRIC GENERALISED EIGENVALUES
Input : Symmetric A ∈ Fn×nq ; Symmetric, positive semi-definite B ∈ Fn×nq ;
ε > 0
Output: Verification the helper sent solutions to the generalised eigenvalue
problem AV = BVD to precision ε
Verifier
Choose x ∈R F
Stream in A, B and compute Fx(A), Fx(B)
Pick T > q
2n4




MATRIX MULTIPLICATION(L−1, A)→ L−1A
MATRIX MULTIPLICATION(L−1A, (L−1)T )→ L−1AL−T
SYMMETRIC EIGENSOLVER(L−1AL−T )→ V ′, D
MATRIX MULTIPLICATION((LT )−1, V ′)→ V













XT y [Planitz, 1979].
Theorem 9. There is an annotated streaming
(
max{(d+ 1)2, (d+ 1)n} log(q), log(q)
)
-
protocol for OLS for X ∈ Fn×(d+1)q , y ∈ Fnq as above.
Proof. The algorithm requires two applications of our matrix multiplication protocol to
check that the β provided satisfies (XTX)β = XT y. This avoids explicitly inverting





. Our total communication and space costs for OLS will therefore be
O
(
max{(d+ 1)2, (d+ 1)n} log(q)
)
and O(log(q)) respectively. As XTX , XT and y are
in Fq, we can find a β ∈ Fq and perform an exact equality check.
3.3.2 Principal Component Analysis
Given a large data matrix S ∈ Fn×dq where Sij represents the jth observation of the ith
variable, PCA finds the principal components of the data, which can be used for dimen-
sionality reduction or classification. PCA maximises the variation captured by successive
















maximised with respect to λj , ∀j < i. These vi are the principal components and we can
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Algorithm 9: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES
Input : X ∈ Fn×(d+1)q , y ∈ Fnq
Output: Verification the helper sent β ∈ Fnq with Xβ = y
Verifier
Choose x ∈R Fq
Stream in A and y, compute Fx(A), Fx(y) (treat y as a n× 1 matrix).
Run
GRAMIAN MATRIX(X)→ Fx(XTX)
MATRIX MULTIPLICATION(X, y)→ F vecx (XT y)




T y) = F vecx ((X
TX)β)
end
perform dimensionality reduction on S by choosing the k columns of V = [v1, ..., vn] cor-
responding to the k largest λi and forming V T1...kS = S
′ ∈ Fn×kq . This is equivalent to
finding vectors corresponding to approximate eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of S.




















Note the 1n−1 comes from us eliminating the bias from sampling the n points of S
↓
i , for each
i ∈ [d].
The covariance matrix is the matrix with each element Cov(S)ij being the covari-
ence of the ith column of S and the jth column of S. It aims to capture the variability of
two random variables, i.e. if large values of S↓i correspond to large values of S
↓
j , then the
covariance will be positive, likewise if these values tend to show the opposite behaviour
(large values of S↓i correspond to small values of S
↓
j ) then the covariance will be negative.
This can be useful in statistical analysis for summarising trends in data sets.
In our setting, the equation in Definition 7 doesn’t allow us to stream S and compute
the fingerprint. However, by rewriting the formula, and using the earlier trick of getting the
prover to resend the matrix in a ‘nice’ order, we can efficiently compute the fingerprint of
Cov(S) so we can use it in our protocols. Using outer product, we can write the covariance






. There is some abuse of
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notation here, S̄ is a n × d matrix with each row element being the mean of the respective
column of S.




-protocol for computing the covariance matrix of
S ∈ Fn,d.
Proof. Using the primitives of Section 3.2, Algorithm 10 shows how we can produce the
fingerprint of the (scaled) covariance matrix using









Note we scale the covariance matrix to keep it in the field Fq. We will use the GRAMIAN






































































For an integer x, 1−x
n2
(1−x) will be an integer, hence remain in the field Fq. However, we will
need to scale by a factor of n. Our algorithm therefore runs as follows:
Algorithm 10: COVARIANCE FINGERPRINT






Choose x ∈R F
Stream in S, compute Fx(S) and Fx(nS̄)
Run
GRAMIAN MATRIX(nFx(S)− Fx(nS̄))→ n2(n− 1) Cov(S)
Using the prior protocols to check matrix multiplication and approximate eigenvec-
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tors (Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3), we can check PCA results to any desired precision ε > 0
with the costs stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Given S ∈ Fn×dq and ε > 0, we can verify that PCA has been done to the






















protocol presented in Algorithm 10.








to ensure that V has the necessary properties, i.e. is almost orthogo-
nal, and each claimed eigenvector acts on the covariance matrix as an approximate stretch.
Each principal component vi corresponds to var(v̂Ti S) = λ̂i and | var(v̂Ti S)− T λ̂i| ≤ Tε,
allowing us to reduce the dimensionality of S, confident of how much variance we are re-
moving with each principal component. Soundness and correctness then follow from the
invoked protocols.
Algorithm 11: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Input : S ∈ Fn×dq
Output: Verification V are the principal components of S with direction vi
describing λi∑d
j=1 λj
of the variance in V TS.
Run
COVARIANCE FINGERPRINT(S)→ Fx(n2(n− 1) Cov(S))
Prover
Send n2(n− 1) Cov(S)
Verifier









n2(n− 1) Cov(S), ε
)
→ (V,D)
3.3.3 Fisher Linear Discriminant Analysis
In Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), we again have a large data matrix S ∈ Fn×dq , with
Sij representing the jth observation of the ith variable, however, we also have a classifi-
cation for each observation, ωm for m ∈ [k], where we have k classes. The aim is to do
dimensionality reduction, as in PCA, while simultaneously maximizing the class discrim-
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inatory information between the classes in the reduced dimension.
If we have k classes, we wish to transform S to a new set S′ ∈ Fn×(k−1)q , i.e.
S′ = W TS where W ∈ Fd×(k−1)q is a matrix projecting S to S′ and S′ has the maximum




Within-class scatter SW =
∑k
i=1 Cov(Si)
Between-class scatter SB =
∑k
i=1 ni(µi − µ)(µi − µ)T
We first treat the two-class case, then generalize to k classes.
Two Classes
To find w ∈ Fdq we split S into two matrices, S1 ∈ Fn1×dq holding the observations in class
1 with average µ1 ∈ Fn1q , and S2 ∈ Fn2×dq for the observations in class 2 with average
µ2 ∈ Fn2q . Then our two scatter matrices are:
SW = Cov(S1) + Cov(S2) and SB = (µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)T
To ensure that we can easily represent elements in the finite field, we actually find




. As such, these rescalings do not affect the result. Using the KKT con-
ditions [Kleinberg and Tardos, 2006], we shift this to solving SBw = λSWw, for some
λ.










−protocol for verifying LDA with 2
classes on S ∈ Fn×dq .
Proof. We can simplify SBw = λSWw for 2 classes, since for all vectors v ∈ Rd;
SBv = (µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)T v
As (µ1 − µ2)T v is just a scalar, SBv simply scales (µ1 − µ2). Hence we get that SBw =
λSWw is equivalent to α(µ1−µ2) = λSWw. To verify we have been sent the correct w, all
we need do is check that SWw = (µ1 − µ2), and our result will lie in the (scaled-up) field,





have log(qn6) due to the scaling of the scatter matrices by N = n21(n1−1)n22(n2−1).
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Algorithm 12: TWO CLASS LDA
Input : S ∈ Fn×dq
Output: Verification that w ∈ Fdq maximises J(w).
Verifier




COVARIANCE FINGERPRINT(S1)→ Fx(n21(n1 − 1) Cov(S1))
COVARIANCE FINGERPRINT(S2)→ Fx(n22(n2 − 1) Cov(S2))
Verifier
Compute Fx(NSW ) = n22(n2 − 1)Fx(n21(n1 − 1) Cov(S1))
+n21(n1 − 1)Fx(n22(n2 − 1) Cov(S2))
Run
MATRIX MULTIPLICATION(NSW , w)→ F vecx (NSWw)
Verifier
Check
F vecx (NSWw) = NF
vec
x (µ1)−NF vecx (µ2)
end
k Classes
With k classes, we now need to find a matrix W ∈ Fd×k−1q . We still want to maximise the
ratio between the between-class and within-class scatter, J(W ). The simplification to an
eigenvalue problem is more complex here, but from Devijver and Kittler [1982] we see it
reduces to finding (at most) k− 1 eigenvectors with non-zero real eigenvalues of the matrix
S−1W SB .
Consider A,B ∈ Fn×nq , with A symmetric, and B symmetric positive semi-definite
(psd) the task is to find V,D ∈ Rn×n such that AV = BVD where A = SB and B = SW .
SW is the sum of positive semi-definite matrices, and as such is positive semi-definite, this
allows us to use the Symmetric Generalised Eigenvalue Method.












-protocol for verifying LDA
with k classes on S ∈ Fn×dq to precision ε > 0.
Proof. We stream in and fingerprint S, which then allows us to receive in the data class
by class to build up the scatter matrices, with this we then use the method in Section 3.2.6













however that we are only interested in columns of V̂ corresponding to non-zero eigenvalues.
We can use these get our r ≤ k− 1 vectors to form W and compute W TS using the matrix
multiplication protocol to get the desired result. Algorithm 13 shows the processes of the
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Algorithm 13: K CLASS LDA
Input : S ∈ Fn×dq , with k classes Sk ∈ Fnk×dand
∑k
i=1Ni = n, ε > 0
Output: Verification that W ∈ Fd×k−1q maximises J(W ) to our precision.
Verifier
While streaming S compute F vecx (F
vec





















n2k(nk − 1) Cov(Sk)
)
Verifier







i (ni − 1).
Prover











x (µ̂1), ..., F
vec



























SYMMETRIC GENERALISED EIGENVALUES(NSW , w)→ Fx(V ), Fx(D)
Prover
Send the r < k− 1 largest non-zero eigenvectors, W , and their eigenvalues
Then send the remaining eigenvectors, and their eigenvalues
Run
MATRIX MULTIPLICATION(W T , S)→ Fx(W TS)
Verifier
Check
The sent messages from the prover are consistent with Fx(V ), Fx(D)
end
algorithm in detail. The scaling factor we use will be scaled n3k to find SW , then q3n4 to
run SYMMETRIC GENERAL EIGENVALUES.
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3.4 Practical Results
We performed a series of experiments with a field size of q = 231 − 1, using implementa-
tions in C of our protocols for matrix multiplication and eigen-decomposition. We used a
machine with an Intel i7 processor and 16 GB of memory. We worked on matrices up to
1000 by 1000, as this allowed us to get a distinguishing result between the verifier running
the computation and the verifier using our checking protocols. We used the GNU Sci-
entfic Library for C, using gsl blas dgemm for matrix multiplication and gsl eigen symm
for the eigen-decomposition. The verification was done on the result produced by the self-
computation. We created dense random matrices with entries drawn uniformly. Note that
our protocols do not depend on any structure in the matrices, so uniform random data suf-
fices to test them. Where we require symmetric matrices, we set Aij = Aji ∀i < j.
Our verification protocols were built as discussed above, with the time taken to find
the fingerprints of all relevant matrices and check the necessary bounds being the verifica-
tion time seen in Figure 3. We tested the verification protocols against a variety of perturbed
matrices, i.e. we added a error matrix to the solution with values greater than the error al-
lowable in the protocol, and all of these were successfully rejected. The memory costs for
our verification, even in the case of A ∈ F1000×1000q was only a few hundred bytes, a sig-
nificant reduction over self computation, which would be in the order of several megabytes.
The communication cost is the cost of sending the matrix, simply the size of the matrix
multiplied by a small constant.
Consequently, the main aim of our experiments is to quantify the potential timing
gains of verification over self-computation.
For our matrix multiplication protocol (Figure 3.1), we consider the number of
scalar multiplications required to find the result of multiplying A ∈ Fk×nq and B ∈ Fn×kq ,
that is, k2n. When we plot the time taken against k2n, we see the expected linear relation-
ship between self-computation and time taken. The verifier needs to compute the fingerprint
ofA,B, which will involve nk multiplications, andAB, which involves k2 multiplications.
This agrees with the observation in the graph; that the self-computation time is linear, and
the verification time is sublinear.
In eigen-decomposition (Figure 3.2), we see the expected cubic increases in run-
ning time for self-computation, with a significantly lower increase for the verification. The
verification running time depends primarily on the O(n2) cost of computing the needed
fingerprints, as above, and as such, we see the asymptotically shallower lower curve.
In the next chapter, we will examine a lot more the practicality of the different
properties of a streaming interactive proof, such as prover overhead and streaming cost.
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Figure 3.1: Matrix Multiplication of
A ∈ Fk×nq and B ∈ Fn×kq and 500 runs
per test, for n, k ∈ {10i : i ∈ [20]}.
The blue marks represent the man-
ual multiplication time, the red marks
represent the time the verifier spends
checking.














Figure 3.2: Eigen-decomposition of
symmetric A ∈ Fn×nq with ε = 0.01
and 150 runs per test.
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Chapter 4
Achieving Optimal Costs through
Interactivity
This chapter is formed from the 2019 ISAAC paper “Efficient Interactive Proofs for Linear
Algebra.” written by Graham Cormode and Chris Hickey.
4.1 Motivation
The pitch for cloud computing services is that they allow us to outsource the effort to store
and compute over our data. The ability to gain cheap access to both powerful computing
and storage resources makes this a compelling offer. Streaming interactive proofs allow
us to explore the questions of trust and reliability in this setting. The question we wish to
answer here is simple: What costs do we want to reduce in a streaming interactive proof?
In this work, we focus on studying primitive computations within linear algebra —
a core set of tools with applications across engineering, data analysis and machine learning.
We make four main contributions:
• We consider protocols with variable interactivity for inner product and matrix mul-
tiplication and present lightweight tunable verification protocols for these problems.
We also produce an entirely new protocol for vector-matrix-vector multiplication.
• Our protocols allow us to trade off computational effort and communication size
against the number of rounds of interaction. We show it is often desirable to have
fewer rounds of interaction.
• We optimize the costs for the cloud, and show that the protocols impose a computa-
tional overhead that is typically much smaller than the cost of the computation itself.
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• Our experimental study confirms our analysis, and demonstrates that the absolute cost
is minimal, with the client’s cost significantly less than performing the computation
independently.
4.1.1 Quantifying Costs
We use the definitions from Section 2, namely Definition 3. Our principle concern now will
be the costs described in Section 2.4.
Definition 8. For a function f we say that there is a d-round (h, v)−protocol if there is a
valid protocol for f with
• Verifier Memory s — Verifier uses O(s) working memory.
• Communication h— The total communication between the two parties isO(h). Note
that we do not include the cost of sending the claimed solution in this cost.
• Interactivity d — at most 2d messages sent between H and V .
Furthermore, we quantify the computational costs by
• Verifier Streaming Cost — The work during the initial stream.
• Verifier Checking Computation — The work for the interactive stage.
• Helper Overhead — The additional work outside of solving the problem.
Problem Statement. We seek optimal or near optimal verification protocols for core lin-
ear algebra operations. The canonical (and previously studied) example is the multiplication
of two matrices A ∈ Fk×nq , B ∈ Fn×k
′
q , where Fq is the finite field of integers modulo q,
for some prime q > M2n, where M = maxi,j(Aij , Bij) or chosen sufficiently large to
not incur overflows. Our protocols work on any prime size finite field, consistent with prior
work. This allows computation over fixed precision rational numbers, with appropriate
scaling. For ease of exposition, we assume in this paper that n = k = k′, although all
our algorithms work with rectangular matrices. The resulting matrix AB is assumed to be
too large for the verifier to conveniently store, and so our aim is for the helper to allow the
verifier to compute a fingerprint of AB [Rabin, 1981], defined formally in Section 2.5.1,
that can be used to check the helper’s claimed answer.
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4.1.2 Prior Work
As discussed in Chapter 2, interactive proofs were introduced in the 1980s, primarily as
a tool for reasoning about computational complexity. The notion that interactive proofs
could be a practical tool for verifying outsourced computation was advocated by Gold-
wasser et al. [2008]. This paper introduced the powerful GKR (or ‘muggles’) protocol for
verifying arbitrary computations specified as arithmetic circuits. Several papers, to cite but
a few, have aimed to optimize the costs of the GKR protocol [Cormode et al., 2012; Vu
et al., 2013; Thaler, 2013], or to provide systems for verifying general purpose computation
under a variety of computational or cryptographic models [Setty et al., 2012a,b; Parno et al.,
2016]. The latter of which tackle large classes of problems using arguments, which con-
sider a computationally bounded prover. We consider only proofs as we can achieve highly
efficient protocols without requiring restriction on the prover, or use of cryptographic as-
sumptions; the prover runs efficiently in the honest case, and we remain secure against
unbounded provers. Furthermore, some costs associated with such verification still remain
high, such as requiring a large amount of pre-processing on the part of the helper, which
can only be amortized over a large number of invocations. For the common and highly
symmetric algebraic computations we work with in this paper, it is beneficial to build a
specialised protocol.
Other work has considered engineering protocols for specific problems that are
more lightweight, and so trade generality for greater practicality. The motivation is that
some primitives are sufficiently ubiquitous that having special purpose protocols will out-
weigh the effort to design them. An early example of this is given by Frievalds’ algorithm
for verifying matrix multiplication [Freivalds, 1979]. This and similar algorithms unfortu-
nately don’t directly work for verifiers that can’t store the entire input. This line of work was
initiated for problems arising in the context of data stream processing, such as frequency
analysis of vectors derived from streams [Chakrabarti et al., 2009]. Follow-up work ad-
dressed problems on graph data [Cormode et al., 2011; Chakrabarti and Ghosh, 2019; Bera
et al., 2020; Chakrabarti et al., 2020a,b], data mining [Daruki et al., 2015] and machine
learning (Chapter 3, Sabater et al.).
These papers tend to consider either the non-interactive case (minimizing the num-
ber of rounds), or have a poly-logarithmic number of rounds (minimizing the total com-
munication). We wish to explore the middle ground. For example, Cormode et al. [2011]
introduces an interactive inner product protocol which can accommodate a variable number
of rounds. This work assumes that setting the number of rounds to be log(n) will be uni-
versally optimal, an assumption we reassess in this work. Similarly, in Thaler [2013] the
matrix multiplication protocol takes place over O(log(n)) rounds. Our observation is that























O(n1−a) O(na) 1 O(n log(n))
O(n)
O(log(n))
Table 4.1: Different SIPs for Inner Product with u, v ∈ Fnq , with n = ld and a ∈ [0, 1],
we exclude the log(q) factors for storing field elements. Note that Cormode et al. [2011]
introduce the sum-check protocol for l and d, but do the prover analysis for l = 2, and do
not achieve this work’s prover run time for l 6= 2.
active. Taking into account latency and round-trip time between participants, the preferred
setting might be a constant number of rounds, which yields a communication cost which is
a small polynomial in the input size, but which is not significantly higher in absolute terms
from the minimal poly-logarithmic cost.
We summarize the current state of the art for the problems of computing inner prod-
uct (Table 4.1) and matrix multiplication (Table 4.2), and show the results we obtain here for
comparison. For both tables, we see that our results with variable interactivity achieve the
same asymptotic costs at the extremes, aside from the non-interactive matrix multiplication
protocol. This allows us to maintain the state of the art lower bounds of these problems,
whilst maintaining the desired flexibility.
Lastly, we comment again that our results are restricted to the information-theoretically
secure model of Interactive Proofs, and are separate from recent results in the computational
(cryptographic) security model [Ben-Sasson et al., 2016; Canetti et al., 2018]. Furthermore
discussion of interactivity of proofs in the computational setting become irrelevant when
one considers the Fiat-Shamir protocol, which allows an interactive proof to be replaced by
a non-interactive protocol by sacrificing information security (hence shifting to arguments
over proofs [Fiat and Shamir, 1986].
4.1.3 Contributions and outline
Our main contribution is an investigation into the time-optimal number of rounds for a
variety of protocols. We adapt and improve protocols for inner product and matrix multi-




















O(n2) O(1) 1 O(1) O(n2) O(n2)
Table 4.2: Different SIPs for Matrix Multiplication with A,B ∈ Fn×nq and n = ld, we
exclude the log(q) factors for storing field elements.
cation. We then perform experiments in order to evaluate the time component of each stage
of interaction.
We begin in Section 4.2 by re-evaluating how to measure the communication cost of
a protocol, and propose to combine the competing factors of latency and bandwidth into a
total time cost. This motivates generalized protocols that take a variable number of rounds,
where we can pick a parameter setting to minimizes the total completion time.
In Section 4.3 we build on previous protocols of Cormode et al. [2011, 2012] to
construct novel efficient variable round protocols for core linear algebra operations. We
begin by revisiting variable round protocols for inner product. We leverage these to ob-
tain new protocols for matrix multiplication and vector-matrix-vector multiplication (which
does not appear to have been studied previously) with similar asymptotic costs.
In Section 4.4, we thoroughly analyse the practical computation costs of the result-
ing protocols, and compare to existing verification methods. We perform a series of experi-
ments to back up our claims, and draw conclusions on what the most appropriate parameter
setting for streaming interactive proofs in practice. We show that it can be preferable to use
fewer rounds, despite some apparently higher costs.
4.2 How Much Interaction Do We Want?
Prior work has sought to find ‘optimal’ protocols which minimize the total communication
cost. This is achieved by increasing the number of rounds of interaction, with the effect of
driving down the amount of communication in each round. The minimum communication
is typically attained when the number of rounds is polylogarithmic [Cormode et al., 2012].
The non-interactive case represents another extreme in this regard, requiring a single mes-
sage from the helper to verifier. This allows the parties to work asynchronously at the cost
of larger total communication.
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In this section we argue that the right approach is neither the non-interactive case
nor the highly-interactive case. Rather, we argue that a compromise of ‘moderately inter-
active proofs’ can yield better results. To do so we consider the overall time required to
process the proof.
The key observation is that the time to process a proof depends not just on the
amount of communication, but also the number of rounds. In the protocols from Table 4.1
and 4.2, each round cannot commence until the previous round completes, hence we incur
a time penalty as a function of the latency between the two communicating parties. The
duration of a round depends on the bandwidth between them. Thus, we aim to combine
number of rounds and message size into a single intuitive quantity based on bandwidth and
latency that captures the total wall-clock time cost of the protocol.
For matrix multiplication, the variable round protocols summarized in Table 4.2
spread the verification over d rounds, and have a total communication cost proportional to
dn1/d. Hence, we write the time to perform the communication of the protocol as T =
2dL + 2dn
1/d log(|F|)
B , where latency (L) is measured in seconds, and bandwidth (B) in bits
per second. This expression emerges due to the 2d changes in direction over the protocol,
and considering a protocol that sends a total of 2dn1/d field elements (from the analysis in
Section 4.3.2).
We measured the cost using typical values of L and B observed on a university
campus network, where the ‘ping’ time to common cloud service providers (Google, Ama-
zon, Microsoft) is of the order of 20ms, and the bandwidth is around 100Mbps. From the
above equation for T we see that, for a field size |F|, the value of 2n1/dd log(|F|)/B is
dominated by 2dL for even small d under such parameter settings. Hence, we should prefer
fewer rounds as latency increases. Figure 4.1 shows the number of rounds which mini-
mizes the communication time as a function of the size of the input. We observe that the
answer is a small constant, at most just two or three rounds, even for the largest input sizes,
corresponding to exabytes of data.
4.3 Protocols for Linear Algebra Primitives
Using the previously discussed primitives for SIPs, we show how they have been used in
inner product [Cormode et al., 2012]. We then use this to construct a new variable round
method for matrix multiplication, and extend it to achieve a novel vector-matrix-vector
multiplication protocol.
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Figure 4.1: Optimal number of rounds for matrix multiplication of various sizes when con-
sidering only communication time, with a field size q = O(n3).
4.3.1 Inner Product
Given two vectors a, b ∈ Fnq , the verifier wishes to receive aT b ∈ Fq from the helper. We
give a straightforward generalization of the analysis of a protocol in Cormode et al. [2011],
as an application of sum-check on the LDEs of a and b. This variable round protocol has
costs detailed below.
Theorem 13. Given a, b ∈ Fnq , there is a (d − 1)-round (ld, l + d)-protocol with n = ld





, verifier overheadO(nld), and
checking cost O(ld).
The analysis from Cormode et al. [2011] sets l = 2 and d = log(n), and the compu-
tational cost for the verifier is O(log(n)) while the cost for the helper is O(n log(n)). For
general l and d these costs becomeO(ld) andO(nld) for the verifer and helper respectively.
In Cormode et al. [2012] it is shown how the helper’s cost can be reduced to
O(n log(n)) for d = 2 and l =
√
n using the Discrete Fast Fourier Transform to make
a fast non-interactive protocol. We extend this for arbitrary d and l, and show how by com-
bining with sum-check we can keep the helper’s computation low, proving Theorem 13.







f̃a(k0, ..., kd−1)f̃b(k0, ..., kd−1) (4.1)
can be verified using a (d − 1)-round (ld, l + d)-protocol with helper computation time
O(n log(n)d ), and verifier computation time O(ld), overhead time O(nld).
Proof. First, set
g(k0, ..., kd−1) = f̃a(k0, ..., kd−1)f̃b(k0, ..., kd−1).
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g : Fdq → Fq is a degree 2l polynomial in each variable. Now, consider round j + 1 of the







g(r1, ..., rj−1, x, kj+1, ..., kd).
Here, g is degree 2l polynomial, sent to V as a set GΣj =
{
(gj(x), x) : x ∈ [2l]
}
. To
compute this set we have H find the individual summands as
Gj =
{(
g(r1, ..., rj−1, x, kj+1, ..., kd−1), x
)
: x ∈ [2l], kj+1, ..., kd−1 ∈ [l]
}
.
Naive computation of all the values in Gj takes time O(nd) each, for a total cost per round
of O(nld−jd). However, instead of computing the LDE at ld−j points with cost O(ld) we
can sum ld−j convolutions of length 2l vectors to obtain the same result.
In order to prove this claim, we consider the computation of aTa (also referred to
as F2). The general case of aT b follows the same steps but the notation quickly becomes




i . This is
equivalent to finding the inner product of a with itself.
Consider a d − 1 round protocol for the F2 problem on a ∈ Fnq . We have n = ld,







f̃A(r0, ..., rj−1, x, kj+1, ..., kd−1)
2,
where the input is reshaped as the d-dimensional A ∈ Fl×l×...×l. There are d − 1 such
polynomials to send over the course of the protocol, and each one has degree 2l − 1.







f̃A(x, k1, ..., kd−1)
2.
This can be found by materializing the set of values G0 =
{(
f̃A(x, k1, ..., kd), x
)
: x ∈
[2l], k1, ..., kd−1 ∈ [l]
}
, and then summing over k1, . . . , kd to obtain GΣ0 .
For the first half of the GΣ0 , the computation is closely linked to the original input,
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f̃A(x, k1, ..., kd−1)
2.
These sums partition the input, so the total time is O(n) to obtain the values for all x ∈ [l].
However, for x values in the range l + 1 . . . 2l, we need to evaluate the LDE at
locations not present in the original input. To avoid the higher cost associated with naive
computation of all terms, we expand the definition of LDEs:














In what follows, we can make use of the fact that not all input values contribute to































































































0 pj 6= kj1 pj = kj













to simplify the notation. We define the vectors
bk1...kd−1(p) =
Ap,k1...kd−1q(p) for p ∈ [0, l − 1], k1, ..., kd−1 ∈ [0, l − 1]0 for p ∈ [l, 2l − 1], k1, ..., kd−1 ∈ [0, l − 1]




























Thus, by precomputing some arrays of values, we reduce the computation to several
convolutions that can be evaluated quickly via fast Fourier transform. Observe that this
FFT does not need to be computed over the same field as the matrix multiplication: we can
choose any suitably large field for which there is an FFT (say, real vectors of size 2j for
some j), and then map the result back into Fq. Forming bk1...kd(p) takes time O(ld). We
have to do O(ld−1) convolutions on vectors of length O(l), so each convolution takes time
O(l log(l)). Since log(l) = log(n
1
d ), we can write the helper’s time cost for the first round
as O(nd log(n)).
Round j. Similar rewritings are possible in subsequent rounds. Initially, it may seem
that things are more complex for Gj , as each f̃A(r0, ..., rj−1, x, kj+1, ..., kd−1) appears to
require full inspection of the input to evaluate at (r0, ..., rj−1). However, we can again
define an ancillary array bk1...kd−1 to more easily compute this. In the sum-check protocol
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This allows the Helper to form G1 using the same idea as above, but with A(1) instead of
A. Working in terms of A(1) reduces the Helper’s cost from O(ld−1ld) for computing the
f̃A(r0, k1, ..., kd−1) for each ki ∈ [l] to just O(l2) when combined with using bk1...kd−1 .
In more detail, and with more generality, let us consider the jth round, where we


















































































































q(p) for p ∈ [0, l − 1], kj+1, ..., kd ∈ [0, l − 1]
0 for p ∈ [l, 2l − 1], kj+1, ..., kd−1 ∈ [0, l − 1]



























DFT−1(DFT(bkj ...kd) · DFT(g))
 [x]2






















Using this formulation, the dominant computation cost in round j will be from the
FFT, which involves ld−j−1 convolutions of cost O( ld log(n)) each. Thus the final cost for
the round is O( l
d−j
d log(n)). The cost of running the entire protocol requires d− 1 rounds,















since l ≥ 2. Note that when d = log(n) and l = 2, we achieve O(n) time for the helper.
The cost increases with fewer rounds, up to a maximum of O(n log n) for a constant round
protocol.
Cost summary. For the verifier, the checking computation cost is O(ld), which emerges
from the d rounds, where in each round the verifier sums the first l elements of GΣj , before
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evaluating the LDE of GΣj at rj , making for a total cost of O(l). The streaming overhead
for the verifier involves evaluating the LDE of the input A, for a cost of O(nld) The verifier
requires O(l + d) memory to find the LDE of a at r ∈ Fd. The communication will be




Verifier Memory O(l + d)
Helper Computation Time O(n log(n)d )
Verifier Time O(nld)
Verifier Checking Computation Time O(ld)
The total cost of each convolution is O(l log(l)). Summing these ld−j convolutions














. The remaining costs are as in our version of
the sum-check protocol (Section 2.5.3).
4.3.2 Matrix Multiplication
By combining the power of LDEs with the matrix multiplication methods from Chapter 3,
we can create a protocol with only marginally larger costs than inner product.
Theorem 14. Given two matrices A,B ∈ Fn×nq , we can verify the product AB ∈ Fn×nq
using a d-round (ld, l + d)-protocol with verifier time O(n2ld), checking time O(ld) and
prover computation time O(n2) (on top of time to perform matrix multiplication).
Proof. We make use of the matrix fingerprints from Section 2.5.1, and generate the fin-












where A↓i denotes the ith column of A and B
→
j is the jth row of B. Effectively, the prover
is sending a matrix C, claiming C = AB, then the protocol has the prover convince the




















Our fingerprint Fx(AB) is then given by the inner product of Acol and Brow. We apply the
inner product protocol of Theorem 13, hence we need to show the verifier can evaluate the
LDE of the product of these two vectors at a random point,
l−1∑
kd−1=0
f̃Acol(r0, ..., rd−2, kd−1)f̃Brow(r0, ..., rd−2, kd−1),
which we denote as Σf̃Acol(r)f̃Brow(r). We can construct this value in the initial stream by
storing, for each value of kd−1, f̃Acol(r0, ..., rd−1, kd−1) and f̃Brow(r0, ..., rd−1, kd−1), which
is done in space O(ld) for the verifier. Each of these requires an initial verifier overhead
of O(ld) for each of the n2 elements, then checking requires O(ld) as in Theorem 13.
The helper has to fingerprint the matrices to form Acol and Brow, at a cost of O(n2). The
result follows by using the generated fingerprint to compare to the fingerprint of the claimed
result AB (which is provided by the helper in some suitable form, and excluded from the
calculation of the protocol costs).
Note that the helper is not required to follow any particular algorithm to compute
the matrix product AB. Rather, the purpose of the protocol is for the helper to assist the
verifier in computing a fingerprint of AB from its component matrices. The time cost of
this is much faster: linear in the size of the input.
Fingerprinting versus LDEs. Our protocol in Theorem 14 is stated in terms of fingerprints.








This uses the inner product definition of matrix multiplication, whilst we use the outer
product property of fingerprints. Finding f̃AB(R1, R2) during the initial streaming has cost
per updateO(log(n)). For our method, we find Σf̃Acol(r)f̃Brow(r), which has costO(ld). In
the case l = 2, d = log(n), we see these two methods are very similar. The methods differ
in how we respond to receiving the result, AB. In Thaler [2013], the verifier computes
the LDE of AB at a time cost of O(n2ld), while our method takes time Õ(n2) to process
the claimed AB, as we simply fingerprint the result. Thaler’s method posesses some other
advantages, for example it can chain matrix powers (findingAm) without the Helper having
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to materialize the intermediate matrices. Nevertheless, in data analysis applications, it is
often the case that only a single multiplication is required.
4.3.3 Vector-Matrix-Vector Multiplication
Vector-matrix-vector multiplication appears in a number of scenarios. A simple example
arises in the context of graph algorithms: suppose that helper wishes to demonstrate that a
graph, specified by an adjacency matrix A, is bipartite. Let v be an indicator vector for one
part of the graph, then vTAv = (1− v)TA(1− v) = 0 iff v is as claimed. More generally,
the helper can show a k colouring of a graph using k vector-matrix-vector multiplications
between the adjacency matrix and the k disjoint indicator vectors for the claimed colour
classes.
We reduce the problem of vector-matrix-vector multiplication (which yields a single
scalar) to inner product computation, after reshaping the data as vectors. Formally, given








uTAv is equal to computing the inner product of A and uvT written as length n2
vectors. Protocols using this form will need to make use of an LDE evaluation of uvT . We
show that this can be built from independent LDE evaluations of each vector.
Lemma 6. Given u, v ∈ Fn and r ∈R Fd, with n = ld
f̃uvT (r0, . . . r2d−1) = f̃u(r0, . . . , rd−1)f̃v(rd, . . . , r2d−1)
Proof. We abuse notation a little to treat uvT as a vector of length n2, and we assume that
n = ld (if not, we can pad the vectors with zeros without affecting the asymptotic be-
haviour). We write R1 = (r0, . . . , rd−1) and R2 = (rd, . . . , r2d−1). The proof follows by
expanding out expression (2.3) to observe that χk(r0 . . . r2d−1) = χk0,...kd−1(R1)χkd,...,k2d−1(R2)
and so
















































Figure 4.2: Detailed Matrix Multiplication Protocol
The essence of the proof is that we can obtain all the needed cross-terms corre-
sponding to entries of uvT from the product involving all terms in f̃u and all terms in f̃v.
We can employ the protocol for inner product using f̃A and f̃uvT , which we can
compute in the streaming phase, as f̃uvT = f̃uf̃v to give us Theorem 15.
Theorem 15. Given u, v ∈ Fn and A ∈ Fn×n, we can verify uTAv using a (d− 1) round






time cost O(nld) and checking time cost O(l).
4.4 Practical Analysis
To evaluate these protocols in practice, we focus on the core task of matrix multiplication.
In order to discuss the time costs associated with execution of our protocols in more detail,
we break down the various steps into components as illustrated in Figure 4.2. Here, we use
Greek characters to describe the costs for the verifier: the initial streaming overhead (t[α]),
the checks performed in total in each round (t[β]), as well as the time to send responses
(t[δ]). For the helper, we identify four groups of tasks, denoted by Latin characters: the
computation of the matrix product itself (t[a]), the communication of this result to the veri-
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fier (t[b0]), and the time per round to compute and send the required message (t[b] and t[c]
respectively).
Recall our discussion in Section 4.2 on the effects of communication bandwidth
and latency on the optimal number of rounds. In our simple model we focused on the tasks
most directly involved with communication (the verifier round cost t[δ] and helper round
cost t[c]). We implicitly treated the corresponding round computation costs (t[β] and t[b])
as nil. As the construction and sending of the solution (t[a] and t[b0]) will dominate the first
stage of the protocol, we focus our experimental study on measuring values of t[b], t[β0]
and t[β] to quantify a reasonable estimate for the length of time the interactive phase of the
protocol takes with bandwidth B and latency L.
We account for the cost required for computation and communication separately to
find the total time, T , as follows:






T is the total time for the protocol from receiving the answer to producing a conclusion of
the veracity of the result. We can omit the verifier’s streaming computation time t[α] from
the total protocol run time, as this can be overlapped with the helper’s computation of the
true answer, which should always dominate.
In what follows, we instantiate this framework and determine the costs of imple-
menting protocols. These demonstrate that while computation cost for matrix multiplica-
tion (t[a]) grows superquadratically, the streaming cost (t[α]) is linear in the input size n.
The dominant cost during the protocol is t[β0], to fingerprint the claimed answer; other
computational costs in the protocol are minimal. Factoring in the communication based on
real-world latency and bandwith costs, we conclude that latency dominates, and indeed we
prefer to have fewer rounds. In all our experiments, the optimal number of rounds is just 2.
Extrapolating to truly enormous values of n suggest that still three rounds would suffice.
4.4.1 Setup
The experiments were performed on a workstation with an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU @
3.40GHz processor, and 16GB RAM. Our implementations were written in single-threaded
C using the GNU Scientific Library with BLAS for the linear algebra, and FFTW3 library
for the Fourier Transform. The programs were compiled with GCC 5.4.0 using the -O3
optimization flag, under Linux (64-bit Ubuntu 16.04), with kernel 4.15.0. Timing was done
using the clock() function for all readings except t[β], which used getrusage() as
the timings were so small.
For the various tests performed, the matrices and vectors were generated using the
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l d t[b] (ms) t[β] (µs)
2 12 0.230±0.02 9±2
4 6 0.120±0.01 14±1
8 4 0.099±0.01 35±7
16 3 0.097±0.01 35±7
64 2 0.110±0.01 43±5
(a) n = 212, t [β0] = 149± 15ms
l d t[b] (ms) t[β] (µs)
2 16 3.5± 0.2 6± 1
4 8 2.0± 0.1 9± 1
16 4 1.6± 0.1 46± 3
256 2 1.8± 0.1 1700± 200
(b) n = 216, t [β0] = 38.0± 6.5s
l d t[b] (ms) t[β] (µs)
2 18 14.1± 0.9 6± 1
4 9 8.0± 0.5 11± 3
8 6 6.3± 0.5 30± 3
64 3 7.1± 0.6 270± 30
512 2 7.8± 0.7 6400± 650
(c) n = 218, t [β0] = 603± 63s






Table 4.4: Matrix Multiplication Timings
C rand() function. Note that the work of the protocols is not affected by the data values,
so we are not much concerned with how the inputs are chosen. The arithmetic field used
was Fq with q = 231− 1 (larger fields, such as q = 261− 1 or q = 2127− 1 could easily be
substituted to obtain much lower probability of error, at a small increase in time cost). The
work of the verifier and work of the helper were both simulated on the same machine.
4.4.2 Matrix Multiplication Results
Table 4.3 shows the experimental results for the matrix multiplication protocol for matrix
sizes ranging from n = 212 to 218. Note, this means we are tackling matrices with tens of
billions of entries. For completeness, we timed BLAS matrix multiplication on our machine
for n = 210 to 213 to give an idea of the comparative magnitude of a (Table 4.4), although
further results were restricted by machine memory. Due to memory limitations, we tested
our algorithms using freshly drawn random values in place of stored values of the required
vectors or matrices. This does not affect our ability to compare the data, and allows us to
increase the data size beyond that of the machine memory.
The computation cost t[a] grows with the cost of matrix multiplication, which is
superquadratic in n, while t[α] grows linearly with the size of the input, which is strictly
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Table 4.5: Time taken for interactions (ping







2 12 440 0.014
4 6 200 0.012
8 4 120 0.015
16 3 80 0.020
64 2 40 0.041
216
2 16 600 0.019
4 8 280 0.018
16 4 120 0.031
256 2 40 0.163
218
2 18 680 0.022
4 9 320 0.020
8 6 200 0.026
64 3 80 0.082
512 2 40 0.328
Table 4.6: Verifier matrix multiplication time










4 6 0.20 0.349
8 4 0.12 0.269
16 3 0.08 0.229





4 8 0.28 38.3
16 4 0.12 38.1





4 9 0.32 603
8 6 0.20 603
64 3 0.08 603
512 2 0.04 603
quadratic in n. Further, the verifier does not need to retain whole matrices in memory, and
can compute the needed quantities with a single linear pass over the input.
We next study the helper’s cost across all d rounds to compute the responses in
each step of the protocol. Our analysis bounds this total cost as O(n log(n)d ). However,
we observe that in our experiments, this quantity tends to decrease as d decreases. We
conjecture that while the cost does decrease each round, the amount of data needed to be
handled quickly decreases to a point where it is cache resident, and the computation takes a
negligible amount of time compared to the data access. Thus, this component of the helper’s
time cost is driven by the number of rounds during which the relevant data is still ‘large’,
which is greater for larger d.
When we look at the contributory factors to t[work], we observe that the dominant
term is by far t[β0], where the verifier reads through the claimed answer and computes the
fingerprint. Thus, arguably, the computational cost of any such protocol once the prover
finds the answer is dominated by the time the verifier takes to actually inspect the answer:
all subsequent checks are minimal in comparison. This justifies our earlier modelling as-
sumption to omit computational costs in our balancing of latency and bandwidth factors.
We now turn to the time due to communication, summarized in Table 4.5. Here,
we can clearly see the huge difference of several orders of magnitude between the latency
cost, 2dL, versus the bandwidth cost, 2dl log(|F|)B . Note that these timing figures are sim-
ulated, based on the average values of latency and the corresponding average bandwidth
found when pinging several cloud servers such as Google, Amazon and Microsoft from a
university network. The dependencies on both latency and bandwidth are linear. Conse-
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quently, if the latency were reduced to 10ms, this would halve the times in the Latency cost
column; similarly, if bandwidth were doubled, this would halve the times in the Bandwidth
cost column. We observe then that for all but very low bandwidth scenarios, the latency
cost will dominate.
Finally, we put these pieces together, and consider the total protocol time from both
computation and communication components. We obtain the total time by summing t[work]
and t[comm], in Table 4.6. These results confirm our earlier models, and the fastest time is
achieved with a very small number of rounds. For all values of n tested in these experiments,
we see the optimal value of d is 2, the minimally interactive scenario. The trend is such that,
because of the sheer domination of latency and t[β0], it is unlikely that more than two or
three rounds will ever be needed for even the largest data sets. As n increases, the size of
t[work] grows faster than t[comm], predominantly due to t[β0]. Therefore to minimize the
cost of verification one should prefer a small constant number of rounds.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Our experimental study supports the claim that fewer rounds of interaction are preferable
to allow efficient interactive proofs for linear algebra primitives. For large instances in our
experiments, the optimal number of rounds is just two. These primitives allow simple im-
plementation of more complex tools such as regression and linear predictors, such as those
in Chapter 3. Other primitive operations, such as scalar multiplication and addition, are triv-
ial within this model (since LDE evaluations and fingerprints are linear functions), so these
primitives collectively allow a variety of computations to be efficiently verified. Further
operators, such as matrix (pseudo)inversion and factorization are rather more involved, not
least since they bring questions of numerical precision and representation handled in Chap-
ter 3. Nevertheless, it remains open to show more efficient protocols for other functions,
such as matrix exponentiation, and to allow sequences of operations to be easily ‘chained




Schemes and Spatial Zero
Knowledge
This chapter is formed from the as yet unpublished joint work of Graham Cormode, Chris
Hickey and Tom Gur.
5.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters cover practical, efficient interactive proofs for common data
analysis problems. We shift our focus here, away from a focus on time and efficiency, but
towards security.
We look now into the idea of zero knowledge, introduced alongside interactive
proofs in Goldwasser et al. [1985]. This is a well studied notion within interactive proofs,
and we wish to extend work in this area to the streaming setting. We do this using commit-
ment schemes.
A commitment scheme is a cryptographic analogue of sending a locked box. It al-
lows a party to commit to a message,m, using a secret key k, to produce c = commit(m, k),
which can be sent to others without revealing the value of m. The commitment c can be
decommited to using a key k, where m = decommit(c, k). As a primitive, commitment
schemes can be used to form the basis of zero-knowledge proof systems.
We want to build streaming zero knowledge proof systems. In order to do this, we
will attempt to create commitment schemes where one of the parties is space-bounded. This
will let us develop the primitives for spatial zero knowledge. We first produce inefficient
protocols for the classic streaming problem of INDEX. We then introduce an improvement to
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the commitment scheme allowing for a efficient streaming zero knowledge implementation
of the sum-check protocol.
We also discuss the applications of such a protocol. We discuss the class of prob-
lems that can be solved by a streaming zero knowledge problem, and compare this to the
problems that can be solved by streaming interactive proofs.
5.2 Commitment Schemes
In the standard commitment scheme setting [Blum, 1983], we have two parties, a ‘sender’
and a ‘receiver’. The sender has a message m and wishes to commit this to the receiver
by sending c = commit(m, k). Formally defining commitment schemes involves defining
what properties we need a commitment to have. We have two main properties we care
about:
Hiding The receiver can not learn the message from just the commitment.
Binding The sender can not decommit to anything but the message.
If a commitment scheme has both of these properties, then we are happy; the sender knows
its message is safely hidden when it’s committed, and the receiver knows the sender can’t
decommit to an arbitrary message. The precise definition of a commitment scheme delves
into three further ideas of hiding/binding security: Perfect, statistical, and computational.
Loosely speaking, when applied to the concepts of hiding and binding these mean the fol-
lowing:
• Computational requires the sender or receiver (or both) to run in polynomial time,
and effectively uses hardness assumptions to achieve the above properties.
• Statistical security tells us both properties hold almost certainly, in the sense that
both parties could potentially cheat and find about about the message, or change the
message after commitment, but they’d have to be very lucky.
• Perfect security means that the receiver couldn’t learn anything at all about the mes-
sage from the commitment, a random guess at the message would be all it could do,
and even then it wouldn’t know it was right. In terms of binding, perfect security
means that the sender absolutely can not decommit to anything but the message it
committed to.
With the intuition down, we present the formal definition of a commitment scheme.
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Definition 9. A commitment scheme is a pair of functions Commit : M× K → C and
Decommit : C × K → M, whereM is the set of messages, K is the set of keys, and C is
the set of possible commitments. Note that f : N → R is a negligible function if ∀c ∈ N
∃Nc such that ∀x > Nc |f(x)| ≤ 1xc . We formally define hiding and binding as follows:
Hiding For a message m ∈ M, let Dist(m) = {Commit(m, k) : k ∈R K} denote the
probability distributions of the commitments to m over all possible choices of k ∈ K.
The commitment scheme is hiding if ∀m0,m1 ∈ M with m0 6= m1, Dist(m0) and
Dist(m1) are indistinguishable in the following sense.
For the scheme to be computationally hiding, the commitments for two different mes-
sages must be indistinguishable to a probabilistic polynomial time receiver. Formally,
for any probabilistic polynomial time ‘distinguisher’ D that has input c taken from
Dist(m0) or Dist(m1) and outputs
D(c) =
0 If D decides c was a commitment to m01 If D decides c was a commitment to m1
We have∣∣∣∣∣∣P(D(c) = 0 | c← Dist(m0))− P(D(c) = 0 | c← Dist(m1))∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ(n),
for some negligible function δ(n) with n = Max
k∈K
(|k|). Effectively, we’re saying the
probability the distinguisher says c was a commitment to m0 correctly is about the
same as the probability it says c was a commitment to m1 incorrectly.
In order to achieve a statistically hiding commitment scheme, we say the above holds
for any computationally unbounded distinguisher. We have a perfectly hiding com-
mitment scheme by then also requiring δ(n) = 0 ∀n.
Binding The commitment scheme is Computationally Binding if any for any PPT algo-
rithm that generates (m,m′, k, k′) ∈M2 ×K2 with m 6= m′ we have
P
(
Commit(m, k) = Commit(m′, k′)
)
≤ δ(n).
For some negligible function δ(n) with n = Max
k∈K
(|k|). Again, intuitively this is
saying that the probability that a polynomial time sender can find a pair of keys and
messages with the same commitment is very, very small.
As with the hiding property, we achieve statistically binding commitment schemes by
allowing any computationally unbounded probabilistic algorithm. We get perfectly
binding commitment schemes by setting δ(n) = 0 ∀n.
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An immediate consequence from this definition is the impossibility of simultane-
ously perfect binding and hiding commitment schemes [Ostrovsky et al., 1992].
Corollary 5. A time-based commitment scheme, as in Definition 9, can not be both perfectly
binding and perfectly hiding.
Proof. If the commitment scheme is perfectly binding, then ∀(m,m′, k, k′) ∈ M2 × K2
with m 6= m′, (
Commit(m, k) 6= Commit(m′, k′)
So for each m ∈ M and k ∈ K there is a unique commitment c ∈ C. Hence a compu-
tationally unbounded receiver, upon receiving a commitment c ∈ C could go through each
possible combination of (m, k) ∈ M×K and compute c′ = Commit(m, k) until it finds
c′ = c, and thus the scheme isn’t perfectly hiding.
And in fact, it can be shown further that we can’t have a commitment scheme with-
out a computationally bounded party [Haitner, 2011].
Corollary 6. Any time-based commitment scheme must be computationally binding or com-
putationally hiding.
These previous two results specifically refer to time-based commitment schemes.
The definition we’re working with at the moment is based off computation restrictions on
the sender and receiver based on a polynomial run-time. However, these above results do
not hold in the space-bounded setting, as we will see.
5.2.1 Space-Bounded Commitment Schemes
In our work, we will be investigating the case when one of the parties is spatially bounded.
We want to adapt Definition 9 to allow for space bounds, as opposed to time bounds. This
will allow us to make commitment schemes that have security in the streaming model,
where we’re dealing with inputs and messages too big to store.
Definition 10. Extending Definition 9, we have a pair of functions Commit :M×K → C
and Decommit : C×K →M, whereM is the set of messages,K is the set of ‘keys’, and C
is the set of possible commitments. The restricted receiver must be able to evaluate Commit
and Decommit for any key-message pair in spaceO(s). We define our commitment scheme
to be spatially binding or spatially hiding if it satisfies the following properties:
Spatially Hiding For a message m ∈ M, let Dist(m) = {Commit(m, k) : k ∈R K}
denote the probability distributions of the commitments tom over all possible choices
of k ∈ K. The scheme is O(s, δ)−spatially hiding if the commitments for two
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different messages must be indistinguishable to a receiver with space O(s) and a
security parameter δ : N → [0, 1]. That is, for any ‘distinguisher’ D with space
O(s) that has input c taken from Dist(m0) or Dist(m1) and outputs
D(c) =
0 If D decides c was a commitment to m01 If D decides c was a commitment to m1,
we have
∣∣P(D(c) = 0 | c← Dist(m0))− P(D(c) = 0 | c← Dist(m1))∣∣ ≤ δ(n),
With n = Max
k∈K
(|k|).
Spatially Binding The commitment scheme is O(s)−Spatially Binding if any for any al-
gorithm (representing the sender) using O(s) space that generates (m,m′, k, k′) ∈
M2 ×K2 with m 6= m′ we have
P
(
Commit(m, k) = Commit(m′, k′)
)
≤ ε(n),
for ε(n) with n = Max
k∈K
(|k|).
The space required for the commitment scheme, O(s), represents a minimum for
the verifier. We will see in our implementations for zero knowledge later, they maintain
security dependent on a security parameter κ.
In time-bounded commitment schemes, we saw that a commitment scheme must
be computationally binding or hiding. This is not the case for space-bounded commitment
schemes. The main reason for this is the change in the way these commitment schemes
can be broken. Time-bounded commitment schemes break their computational binding or
hiding conditions by repeatedly searching for a solution, and they know when they find a
key. On the other hand, for spatially binding or hiding commitment schemes, the mali-
cious party will have to guess the correct key when they see the input, as they’re unable
to store enough data to uncover the commitments after the input. This means that there is
a fundamental bound on the probability of solving the problem immediately, and in mak-
ing this sufficiently small, we immediately achieve the statistical spatial binding or hiding
condition.
5.2.2 Aside: Negligible functions in the Space-Bounded setting
In computational commitment schemes (i.e. commitment schemes with computational hid-
ing or binding) our definition of negligible function makes a lot of sense. We want to make
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sure a polynomial time machine couldn’t stumble upon a ‘bad’ scenario, when
∣∣P(D(c) = 0 | c← Dist(m0)) = P(D(c) = 0 | c← Dist(m1))∣∣
or
Commit(m, k) = Commit(m′, k′).
Our current definition of negligible functions are based on the idea that the sender/receiver
can keep repeating computations until it finds one that works, and so we want to show it’s
unlikely to successfully find something it shouldn’t when restricted to a polynomial number
of attempts. When we have a spatial bound, the weakened party has a different strategy now,
the security comes from the fact that they can’t find something at the time they see the large
input stream. They can’t explicitly repeat computations as they don’t have all the input
stored to check against.
Take the binding property with a space bounded sender. The sender wants to find
(m,m′, k, k′) ∈M2×K2 with Commit(m, k) = Commit(m′, k′). The Commit function
will be a streaming algorithm, and a meaningful space bound here will stop the sender from
storing everything required to run the algorithm in a non-streaming fashion. The situation
is that the sender is restricted to trying a handful of (m, k) pairs, and hence we just need to
be satisfied that it is unlikely that any of these will be a matching pair.
Our definitions require the spatially binding and spatially hiding properties to hold
with ‘sufficiently small’ probability. This will be dependent on the specific memory us-
age of the commitment scheme, but as in time-bounded commitment schemes, we will be
looking to make this super-polynomially small.
5.3 Motivation: Spatial Zero Knowledge
Commitment schemes are a vital primitive that we can use to build useful cryptographic
protocols. One class of these protocols are zero knowledge proofs.
5.3.1 Zero Knowledge
In a normal IP (Definition 1) the prover can reveal any amount of information regarding the
witness that x ∈ L. Zero knowledge IPs consider trying to keep the witness a secret, and
attempting to make the verifier learn nothing more than the fact that x ∈ L. To capture the
knowledge gained by the verifier, we define the view of the verifier.
Definition 11. The verifier’s view of a protocol consists of the verifier’s input x, random
choices VR and received messages. Let View
(V,P )
V (x) denote the view of verifier V with the
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prover P , so if there were k messages m1, ...,mk exchanged in the interactive proof, then
View(V,P )V (x) = (x, VR,m1, ...,mk)
Now we’re ready to define the classical time-constrained verifier zero knowledge.
Definition 12. Given a language L, a perfect zero knowledge protocol is a triplet (P, V, S)
where (P, V ) is an IP, and S is an expected polynomial time probabilistic Turing machine
with white box access to V and knowledge that x ∈ L, where for any polynomial time
probabilistic Turing machine V ∗ and x ∈ L
View(V,H)V (x) = S(x, V
∗).
The idea here is that the verifier learns no information as the probabilistic polyno-
mial time S, without access to the prover, could simulate the exact same outputs the verifier
can with access to the prover. We can additionally define ‘statistical’ and ‘computational’
zero knowledge, using similar methods as in Definition 9.
Definition 13. Given a language L, we can further classify zero knowledge protocols for
our triplet (P, V, S) as follows.
Statistical Define the following two distributions over all inputs x ∈ X (the set of inputs)
DistS = {S(x) : x ∈ X}Dist(P,V ) = {V iew
(V,P )
V (x) : x ∈ X}
We say the protocol is statistical zero knowledge if DistS and Dist(P,V ) are statisti-
cally close, i.e. an unbounded probabilistic ‘distinguisher’ D sampling from DistS
or Dist(P,V ) can distinguish them with probability at most δ(n), where n is the size
of the input and δ(n) is a negligible function. We denote this property of statistically
close for two distributions A and B by A ˜statB.
Computational We say the protocol is computational zero knowledge if DistS and Dist(P,V )
are Computationally close, i.e. an polynomial-time probabilistic ‘distinguisher’ D
sampling from DistS or Dist(P,V ) can distinguish them with probability at most δ(n),
where n is the size of the input and δ(n) is a negligible function. We denote this prop-
erty of Computationally close for two distributions A and B by A ˜compB.
Commitment schemes allow us to build these zero knowledge protocols with ease
(Damgård [1998]). A classic example would be in a public key cryptosystem. In this
setting, each user i in the system has two keys, a public key pi known to everyone, and a
personal private key qi. Each key pair has the property that when we encrypt a message with
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pi(M) = C, we can decrypt it with qi, so M = qi(C). Furthermore, it is computationally
hard (for all intents and purposes - impossible) to discover a pair (M,C) without both
pi and qi. If user i wants to prove to someone they are indeed user i, they need a zero
knowledge protocol, they want to show they know qi without revealing anything other than
that proof of knowledge.
Without commitment schemes, consider the following protocol where the prover,
with knowledge of pi and qi, wishes to prove to the verifier it knows qi.
1. The verifier chooses a message M , and sends C = pi(M).
2. The prover computes M ′ = qi(C), and sends M ′ to the verifier.
3. The verifier checks if M = M ′, if so, the prover must have qi.
This might seem okay, but a vital bit of information has been leaked! Consider what the
verifier has at the end of the protocol, M , C and M ′. This is all good if M = M ′, but
what if the verifier never chose M? The verifier could choose a random C, send it to the
prover, and get back M ′, and now has a pair (C,M ′). If we tried to define a simulator, it
would need to create a pair (C,M ′), which we know isn’t feasible. This is where we need
commitments, and run the protocol as follows:
1. The verifier chooses a message M , and sends C = pi(M).
2. The prover computes M ′ = qi(C), and sends a commitment toM ′ to the verifier.
3. The verifier sendsM to the prover.
4. The prover checksM =M ′ and decommits toM ′.
5. The verifier checks if M = M ′, if so, the prover must have qi.
Here we can see, as long as the commitment scheme is computationally hiding the verifier
can’t learn M ′ and must first reveal it knows M , alleviating us from the problems above.
Using the analogue that the polynomial time verifier is the receiver, we can cre-
ate computational zero knowledge protocols using computationally hiding commitment
schemes. There is a weaker classification of interactive proofs called interactive arguments,
where the prover is now assumed to also be a polynomial time machine, and we can thus
use computationally binding commitment schemes in this setting as well.
Our next plan will be to define a similar notion of zero knowledge proofs for stream-
ing interactive proofs, which we call ‘Spatial Zero Knowledge’. It is worth mentioning
that streaming interactive proofs can work with some currently existing computational zero
knowledge protocols, and the streaming side of things is incidental, as the space constraint
isn’t an issue. We wish to create protocols that actively use the space bounds on the verifier,
and achieve something clearly distinct from computational.
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5.3.2 Spatial Zero Knowledge
We first define streaming interactive proofs, which are the space-bounded analogue of the
interactive proofs from definition 1. Note that the verifier’s space can be smaller than the
size of the input, and in many cases will be. Furthermore, whilst the verifier is no longer
restricted to running in polynomial time, this is more so to demonstrate the strength of the
security induced by the space bound; in our protocols we aim to have verifiers running in
polynomial time.
As with zero knowledge interactive proofs, our concern is that the messages the
prover sends will leak information besides x ∈ L that the verifier couldn’t find out without
the prover. To deal with this, we introduce the idea of a simulator, who attempts to generate
the view of the verifier when interacting with the prover. The prior definition however
implies the verifier keeps the entirety of the messages. We need to adapt this definition for
the verifier who can’t store the entire message.
Definition 14. The space-bounded verifier’s view of a protocol for a verifier with space
O(s) consists of the verifier’s summaries of the input x, random choices VR and received
messages. Let View(V,P )V (x) denote the view of verifier V with the prover P , so if there were
k messages in the interactive proof, then
View(V,P )V (x) =
(
S0(x, VR), S1(S0(x, VR),m1), ..., Sk(Sk−1(...),mk)
)
,
where S0, S1, ..., Sk : F∗ → Fs are the verifier’s summarising functions.
Intuitively, these can be thought of ‘snapshots’ of the verifier’s memory at the ‘crit-
ical points’ of the protocol, i.e. the end of each prover message. Our simulator again has
white-box access to the verifier, so knows the verifier’s randomness, as well as the sum-
marising functions. This will let the simulator generate the transcripts.
Definition 15. Consider language L and a triplet (P, V, S) where (P,V) is a SIP, with space
bound O(s) on the verifier, and S is a simulator with white-box access to the verifier’s
code, space O(s) and knowledge that x ∈ L. This triplet forms a spatial zero knowledge
protocol for L if for any O(s) space-bounded V ∗, and x ∈ L we have
View(V
∗,P )
V ∗ (x) ∼stat S(x, V
∗)
Note that in the above definition View(V
∗,P )
V ∗ (x) and S(x, V
∗) are potentially large
sets of data. The simulator is expected to output a stream of data that forms S(x, V ∗), in
the same way that the prover’s message can be long streams to the verifier.
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5.3.3 Why statistically indistinguishable?
The verifier’s view and the simulator’s output are being compared by a O(s) space distin-
guishing algorithmD. Relating how the distinguisher works in non-spatial zero knowledge,
we could have these classifications
Computational Spatial Zero Knowledge, View(V
∗,P )
V ∗ (x) ∼comp S(x,V
∗) new
The distinguisher, in polynomial time, can’t distinguish between the view and the
simulator’s output.
Statistical Spatial Zero Knowledge, View(V
∗,P )
V ∗ (x) ∼stat S(x,V
∗) new
The distinguisher can’t distinguish the view and simulator’s output except some suf-
ficiently small constant probability.
Perfect Spatial Zero Knowledge, View(V
∗,P )
V ∗ (x) = S(x,V
∗) new
The simulator and view of the verifier are exactly the same.
Looking at these, we see that computational spatial zero knowledge doesn’t make too much
sense. We don’t have a time constraint on the verifier during the protocol, so there is
no real reason to include one afterwards. Furthermore, the notion of ‘perfect spatial zero
knowledge’ is one of contention. We are unsure as it stands if it is a feasible idea in the
streaming setting, and this remains an open question.
This leaves us with ‘statistical spatial zero knowledge’ being the only classification
that makes sense, which is why in Definition 15 we use ∼s for the distinguisher.
5.3.4 Achieving Spatial Zero Knowledge Through Linear Space-Bounded Com-
mitments
In a streaming interactive proof, the verifier will receive messages from the prover, chal-
lenge these messages, and check the responses. The messages from the prover leak infor-
mation. We want to avoid this leakage by having the prover commit to the messages.
For the protocols we’re interested in, there are two main types of checks the verifier
can do; consistency checks, and value checks. In a consistency check, the verifier is making
sure one message is equal to another message. In consistency checks, the verifier doesn’t
necessarily care what the messages are. These often come up during intermediate stages of
protocols. In a value check, the verifier has a known value, v, and needs to check that this
is equal to a message from the prover. Examples of the power of linear commitments in the
space bounded setting will be seen as we go on. Fundamentally, a lot of the tools we use in
SIPs are linear combinations, such as fingerprinting and LDEs.
In the next section, we build a spatially hiding linear commitment scheme to be
able to resolve both of these checks. We will be able to solve linear consistency checks.
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If the verifier has the commitment to two different messages, m1 and m2, they can check
that the difference between the two commitments is 0 by getting the prover to decommit to
m2 −m1. If they are equal, no information should be leaked; the verifier will only know
they were equal. In our protocols, we need to ensure that the consistency checks the verifier
does involve only linear combinations of messages from the prover. This is the case in the
highly powerful sum-check protocol, which we explore in Section 5.7.
For value checks, the verifier often wants to check that the prover’s message is
consistent with a random secret message. The prover will send a series of messages, and the
verifier will compute a function of these messages to compare against the secret message,
with equality only occurring if the prover is honest. If the function is a linear combination,
the verifier will be able to produce the commitment to the secret message, and then can
request the prover decommits to the secret message. In order to maintain zero knowledge,
we have the verifier also send the expected message to the prover, so as to ensure the prover
isn’t being encouraged to decommit to a message previously unknown to the verifier.
Soundness in these protocols comes from the fact the prover doesn’t know the ver-
ifier’s secret check. This is maintained in this new setting. The prover commits to its mes-
sages, and the verifier stores a secret commitment to the linear combination of messages.
The verifier reveals the secret combination so the prover can decommit to the message the
verifier has. The binding property of the decommitment scheme stops the prover from
maliciously changing the commitment here.
5.4 Preliminaries for Spatial Zero Knowledge
In order to construct our spatially hiding commitment scheme, and build our spatial zero
knowledge protocols, we will go through several useful preliminary results. We begin with
several more well-known results within interactive proofs, giving us the necessary back-
ground to build our protocols. These are in addition to our results in Section 2.5. We then
show how these can be used to give intuition behind our commitment protocol.
5.4.1 Polynomial Evaluation Protocol (PEP) [Chakrabarti et al., 2013]
The polynomial evaluation protocol is an interactive proof protocol that allows a verifier
with a single random evaluation of a degree−p (for a multivariate polynomial, we say the
degree is the sum of the individual maximum degrees of each variable) polynomial f :
Fdq → Fq, with help from a prover with knowledge of f in its entirety, to evaluate f at any
other point. For soundness, the protocol requires the random evaluation of the polynomial,
f(r), to be unknown to the prover.
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First, we’ll discuss how polynomials will be sent from the prover to the verifier. If
we consider a set F =
{
(x, y) : x ∈ Fdq , y ∈ Fq
}
, we can construct the LDE of F to
get a polynomial LDE(F, ·) : Fdq → Fq. This polynomial will be at most degree |F |, and
∀(x, y) ∈ F , LDE(F, x) = y.
If the prover needs to communicate a degree−p polynomial to the verifier, it can
send a set of p+ 1 evaluations of the polynomial. The verifier can use LDEs to evaluate the
polynomial at any point. If we had a degree−p polynomial f : Fdq → Fq, with the verifier
holding a secret evaluation f(r) for r ∈R Fdq , the prover could help the verifier compute




: x ∈ Fdq
}
. This will be
a huge set, |F | = pd, but the verifier will be able to compute LDE(F, r) = f(r) to check
that the polynomial agrees with the random known evaluation, and be able to compute
LDE(F, x) = f(x).









protocol is detailed in Algorithm 14.
Algorithm 14: POLYNOMIAL EVALUATION PROTOCOL
Input : f(r) for a degree−p polynomial f : Fdq → F, with r ∈R Fdq , unknown
to the prover, and x ∈ Fdq .
Output: f(x)
Verifier
Compute the line ` : Fdq → Fdq satisfying
`(a) = r `(b) = x
with a, b ∈R Fq, then send ` to the prover.
Prover
Sends the restriction of f to `:




as a set f{`} = {(f |`(t), t) : t ∈ [p]}.
Verifier
Check LDE(f{`}, a) = f(r).
Compute f(x) = LDE(f{`}, b).
Theorem 16. Given a degree−p polynomial f : Fdq → F, and a verifier with space
O(d log(q)) and access to f(r) for r ∈R Fd, Algorithm 14 is a valid streaming interac-
tive proof with communication O(∆ log(q)) and soundness error pq that allows the verifier
to learn f(x) for x ∈ Fdq .
Proof. To show Algorithm 14 is a valid streaming interactive proof, we need to prove
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soundness and completeness. Completeness comes from the previously discussed prop-
erties of LDEs. If the prover did indeed honestly send the set f{`}, then it will be the case
that LDE(f{`}, t) = f |`(t). The verifier’s checks will then correctly succeed with f(r) and
uncover f(x).
In order to show soundness, we need to show that if a dishonest prover sent an
incorrect f{`}. Say the prover sends the set G, which defines g(t) = LDE(G, t). Both
f |`(t) and g(t) will have degree at most p. We also know that g(t) 6= f |`(t) for at least one
t ∈ Fq. Due to fundamental theorem of algebra, it is fact the case that f |` and g can only
agree at p points, the roots of the non-zero polynomial f |`(t)− g(t) = 0. The verifier will
perform the check g(b) = f(r). This will only pass if by chance b is a root of f |`(t)− g(t).
This will happen with probability pq , which we can make arbitrarily small with a suffiently
large field.
5.4.2 SIPs for INDEX
The algorithm described for PEP, in conjuction with the streaming nature of LDEs, provides
a simple and efficient protocol for INDEX. This algorithm, introduced by Chakrabarti et al.
[2013], gives a
(
log(n) log(q), log(n) log(q)
)
protocol for INDEX on a stream A ∈ Fn.
The protocol is described by Algorithm 15. The soundness and correctness of the algorithm
Algorithm 15: INDEX
Input : A ∈ Fnq , followed by j ∈ [n]
Output: Aj
Verifier








follow immediately from Theorem 1. The protocol, however, is not zero knowledge. The
verifier receives LDE(A, ·)`, which it would not be able to construct prior to learning j.
The vital thing here is that the verifier only uses this line at two points, to check LDE(A, r)
and to learn LDE(A, j). In the following sections we will try and construct commitment
schemes that let the prover only reveal information about these two points, without sacrific-
ing soundness.
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5.5 A Spatially Hiding Commitment Scheme
Our goal in this section is to construct a spatially hiding and statistically binding com-
mitment scheme. Recalling our definitions from Section 5.2, this means we’re looking to
construct a commitment scheme allowing a spatially unbounded sender to commit to a mes-
sage m in such a way that a receiver with bounded space can’t learn anything about m until
decommitment.
5.5.1 The Average Case Hardness of INDEX
We will now show how we build up the first spatially hiding commitment scheme, utilizing
the average case hardness of INDEX. The intuition is that a streaming algorithm needs linear
space to confidently solve INDEX. The following result confirms this.
Lemma 7. [Rao and Yehudayoff, 2020] Given a random binary string, x, of length κ,









This statement from Rao and Yehudayoff [2020] tells us that for INDEX with a bi-
nary string, a streaming algorithms’ advantage on knowing xj is barely more than guessing,
for a large κ. For our scheme, our plan will be send a big stream, and hide the message at
a random index. We want to prove that the verifier, a space O(s) streaming algorithm can’t
learn any useful information about the message with high probability.
Lemma 8. For a verifier with space O(s) who receives ρ ∈ Fκq followed by j ∈ [κ] such
that, for m ∈ Fq,
ρi =
m if i = jri for ri ∈R Fq,i 6= j
the probability the verifier will be able to determine if
m ∈ X = {x ∈ Fq : x satisfies some property}
correctly is at most





Proof. From Corollary 6.15 from Communication Complexity and Applications (Rao and
Yehudayoff [2020]), we know that if we have independent random variables, P = {P1, ...,Pκ}
and S(P) jointly distributed, then in the average case over a uniformly random I ∈ [κ],
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entropy of the message S(ρ) ∈ S(P). Given that the verifier has space s, the verifier can





































Note that the reason we have ‘∀j < i’ is that the algorithm will have seen the
preceding ρj prior to storing information about ρi (however, if we expand this to ∀j 6= i,
this would only decrease the probabilities, as further conditioning reduces the entropy).
As P(Pi = ρi) = 1q , we know that








Relating this back to our setting, this corresponds to the Pi represent xi, and S(P)
is the verifier’s summary. If we precondition one of the Pi as m for a random i = j ∈R [κ]
we get the setting in the Lemma for a message m. The above tells us that P(xi = m)
ε
≈
P(xi = m|S() = S(x)). In other words, the probability that xi = m is almost exactly
the probability that xi = m given the verifier’s summary is S(x), i.e. the conditioning
the verifier’s summary gives barely alters the probability that any one uniformly random
element is some specific value.
Now consider some binary property that m ∈ Fq could possess. This could be that
its odd/even parity, the (modulo 2) sum of its digits, or indeed membership in given set. Let
X be the set of elements in Fq satisfying this property. We want to find the probability the
receiver could determine if m ∈ X after engaging in the protocol. Let V (m) be the output
of the receiver after engaging in a commitment protocol to m.
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V (m) =
1 The receiver believes m ∈ X0 The receiver believes m /∈ X
We want to show that the output of the receiver after engaging in the protocol will
not be significantly larger than the probability a random element of Fq is in X . Formally,
we want to show, for a negligible ε > 0, we have:
|Pr (V (m) = 1)− Pr (x ∈ X |x ∈R F)| ≤ ε
Our previous results in this section considered X = {x ∈ F : x = m}, i.e., just seeing
if the receiver can correctly guess m. Now instead of considering a stream ρ ∈ Fκq , we
consider dealing with the stream ρ|X ∈ Fκ2 . This will be the binary string where (ρ|X )i = 1
iff ρi ∈ X . Here, we implicitly assume that the receiver has oracle access to X to determine
membership; if not, this would only make the problem harder. We are now asking if the
receiver can solve INDEX on this stream. It is quite immediate that this inherits the same
hardness from Lemma 7.
5.5.2 The Commitment Scheme
Lemma 8 is what we need to finalise our commitment scheme. Algorithm 16 details the
COMMIT stage, and Algorithm 17 covers the DECOMMIT stage. Loosely speaking, the
protocol has the sender send a stream ρwith the message hidden at a random index k, which
is sent after ρ. The receiver keeps a summary of ρ which it can use to recover the message
at ρk. In our schemes, the summary is a low degree extension of ρ evaluated at a random
point, as the decommitment requires a very small message which can be constructed by a
simulator with the same space as the receiver. However, if the zero knowledge aspect is
no longer required, a simpler protocol could simply have the sender resend ρ, which the
receiver could compare with the previous LDE it kept, and recover ρk. The task now is to
Algorithm 16: COMMIT
Input : m ∈ Fq with a space O(s) receiver and security parameter κ
Output: Receiver holding K(m, k), a commitment to m hidden at index k
Sender
Sends ρ ∈ Fκq followed by k ∈R [κ] with ρi =
{
ri ∈R Fq i 6= k
m i = k
Receiver
Stores K(m, k) = {LDE(ρ, r), r, k} for r ∈R Flog(κ)q .
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Algorithm 17: DECOMMIT
Input : Receiver with K(m, k), a commitment to m






prove the following theorem.
Theorem 17. Algorithm 16 and 17 form a commitment scheme for a message m ∈ Fq




hiding and statistically binding with probability at most log(κ)q .
Proof. We need to prove two conditions:
Spatially Hiding Given two commitments for two different messages, a O(s) receiver can




Statistically Binding The probability the sender is able to successfully decommit to a mes-
sage different to the committed message is at most log(κ)q .
For statistically binding we rely on soundness of the polynomial evaluation protocol. The
sender has sent a stream ρ followed by an index j. The receiver has kept LDE(ρ, r) and
will be looking to evaluate LDE(ρ, j). We know from Theorem 16 that the PEP is sound,
hence the sender engaging in PEP can only convince the verifier of an incorrect LDE(ρ, j)
with probability log(κ)q .
For spatially hiding, we can use Lemma 8, which tells us that the probability the
verifier can learn some property of ρ after seeing the stream and k is only boosted by√
s ln(2)
2κ .
Furthermore, for use in our protocols, we want to show that given knowledge of
m, a simulator can simulate this protocol with space O(s). The prover in the commitment
scheme requires space O(κ), as it needs to store all of ρ. The simulator however knows
what line the verifier will query, hence is only required to store LDE(ρ, ·)|`, which will
require space O(log(κ)).
Lemma 9. The verifier’s view in the above commitment scheme for a verifier of spaceO(s)
can be simulated by a simulator with space O(s), with log(κ) < s.
Proof. Here we want to show that for our commitment scheme, the simulator with white
box access to the verifier and knowledge of m can produce a transcript of the commitment
protocol in space O(s). The simulator can do this as follows:
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1. Produce ρ ∈ Fκ with ρi =
ri ∈R Fq i 6= km i = k
Simultaneously, knowing the r ∈R Flog(κ)q that the verifier will pick, compute `, the
line passing through r and κ when κ is interpreted as an element of Flog2(κ)2 .
2. When the verifier requests LDE(ρ, ·)|` in the PEP decommit stage, send the stored
LDE restricted to the line.




, and as log(κ) < s for the verifier to be able to
compute LDE(ρ, r). We know the simulator can store LDE(ρ)|` in space O(log(κ)) as the
simulator creates ρ, because it knows `, and so just stores log(κ) random evaluations of
LDE(ρ)|`, each of which can be computed in space O(log(κ)).
5.5.3 Warm-up: Zero Knowledge with a O(
√
n) Verifier
Before we go onto more efficient zero knowledge protocols, we will build a protocol for
INDEX with a O(
√
n) space verifier that uses the commitment scheme we just made.
As a brief overview, the protocol works by transforming the vector A ∈ Fnq into a√
n ×
√
n grid in the canonical fashion, with the ultimate aim to find the element at index
(j1, j2). The verifier will store a hash of each column, the inner product of the column with
a random vector r ∈ F
√
n
q , but will only need to use the column corresponding to j2.
At the point of receiving (j1, j2), the verifier has Cj2 =
∑√nAij2ri
i=1 . The prover
sends it’s claimed Âj1j2 , and the verifier reveals
√
n − 1 of it’s random points; all of r






and Cj−2 −mrj1 = Aj1j2 . The prover commits to m, and then the verifier sends Cj2 −
Âj1j2rj1 , which should equal m. This interaction tells the prover that the verifier does
indeed have Cj for the random vector r, so by decommitting m, the prover isn’t leaking
information. The protocol is formally defined by Algorithm 18.
Theorem 18. Algorithm 18 is a spatial zero knowledge protocol for INDEX onA ∈ Fn with
a verifier of space O(
√
n log(q)). The communication cost of the protocol is O(κ log(q)).
Proof. We need to prove this protocol satisfies three definitions: Correctness, soundness
and spatial zero knowledge. For simplicity, we make the assumption that Aj1j2 6= 0. If












Set Cj = 0 ∀j ∈ [
√
n] and choose r1, ..., r√n ∈R Fq.
For Aij
Set Cj += Aijri
(j1, j2) arrives
Verifier












hidden at index k in a random string ρ ∈ Fκq .
Verifier













can send some a ∈R Fq \ {0} and the protocol runs for A+ a, meaning we’re now working
with Cj2 + a
∑√n
i=1 ri.
We begin with correctness. The verifier has stored
∑n
i=1Aijri for each j ∈ [
√
n],
when the verifier sees (j1, j2) it can ignore all but Cj2 =
∑n
i=1Aij2ri. This is effectively a
fingerprint of the column of A containing the index of A that the verifier needs. In order to










Aij2ri. In the above protocol, this is done through our commitment scheme.
The prover sends Âj1j2 , its claimed value of Aj1j2 , followed by a claimed commitment to∑m
i=1
i 6=j1






and this will always pass.
Next we will prove the soundness property. Imagine the prover sends Âj1j2 6=
Aj1j2 , and the verifier computes
Cj2 − Âj1,j2rj1 .




Aij2ri. This needs to agree with Cj2 ,
which the prover doesn’t know. The soundness security comes from the prover not knowing




Aij2ri, in order to convince the verifier of an incor-
rect Âj1j2 the prover would need to know what the verifier computed with Cj2 − Âj1j2rj1 .
If we’re using a statistical binding commitment scheme (Theorem 17) then the prover will
not be able to change the message committed to with high probability. This means that
when the verifier reveals Cj2 − Ãj1,j2rj1 , the prover knows exactly what the verifier wants
to see decommitted, it can’t change anything.
The final property to prove is spatial zero knowledge. This comes from the spatially
hiding property (Theorem 17) and simulatability (Lemma 9) of the commitment scheme.
The protocol described by Algorithm 18 is the first spatial zero knowledge stream-
ing interactive proof. The fundamental crux was the use of INDEX to ‘hide’ the prover
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message, then have the verifier reveal its secret (which is usually required to remain secret
for soundness) to convince the prover the sent message doesn’t tell the verifier something it
shouldn’t.
This is the same idea as a commitment in a zero knowledge protocol for a non-
streaming interactive proof. The prover commits to a proof, and the verifier can query the
commitment at various locations in such a way that it can be sure the proof is correct, but
learning no problem specific information, besides what it already secretly knew.
Algorithm 18 required a niche set-up to have the verifier know exactly what the
prover will send, and this is not easily achievable in an efficient interactive proof, such as
Algorithm 15. Protocols such as these require the verifier to receive several messages in
order to build up a value to compare to its initial summary of the input, and hence check the
protocol was done correctly.
5.5.4 Making the Scheme Linear
As it stands, this commitment scheme has several useful properties. If the receiver has
Commit(m, k) then due to the linearity of LDEs, it can compute αCommit(m, k) =
Commit(αm, k) for α ∈ Fq. We’d like to extend this homogeneity to linearity, i.e. we
want the reciever to be able to construct Commit(αm1 + βm2, k) for α, β ∈ Fq using
Commit(m1, k) and Commit(m2, k).
At the moment the reason that this isn’t possible is quite simple, the commitment
for m1 will hide it within ρ(1) ∈ Fκq , with ρ
(1)
k = m1 for some k ∈ [κ], and m2 is hidden
in some ρ(2) ∈ Fκq where ρ
(2)
l = m2 for some l ∈ [κ]. If k = l, we can achieve this linear
property, as (ρ(1) + ρ(2))k = m1 +m2. The linearity of LDEs tells us that LDE(ρ(1), ·) +
LDE(ρ(2), ·) = LDE(ρ(1) + ρ(2), ·), so the instantiation of PEP remains consistent.
However, it’s not as simple as hiding all the data at the same index. These com-
mitment schemes are useful when we don’t want to decommit to m1 or m2, but want to
decommit to m = m1 + m2. We want to make sure no information about m1 or m2 is
leaked. This is a problem regarding simulatability. For the prior scheme, the simulator
knew m, the final message, and there weren’t intermediate messages. For linear schemes
where the simulator doesn’t know m1 or m2, we need more. In this case the simulator’s
sent ρ won’t necessarily be realistic, it might not contain m1 or m2 at all.
Say the sender hid m1 and m2 in two strings ρ(1) and ρ(2) respectively, at index k,
with m = m1 + m2. The simulator needs to be able to recreate this without knowing m1
or m2. The simulator can commit to two fake messages m∗1 and m
∗





but this doesn’t solve our problem. In order to be simulatable, the transcript should be
indistinguishable from a real transcript. A distinguisher here would be able to notice that
ρ(1) from the simulator is entirely random, whilst ρ(1) from the real sender wouldn’t be.
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The solution to this problem is to add extra randomness to the real sender’s ρ(1) and ρ(2).
In Lemma 9 we had the simulator producing ρ by picking
ρi =
ri ∈R Fq i 6= km i = k
This is possible because the simulator knows m. When the simulator doesn’t know m, the
problem here is that if we had a distinguisher as in Definition 15, it could feasibly pick up
on the difference between ρi and ρ∗i sent by this simulator with
ρ∗i = ri ∈R Fq∀i
We want to allow our simulator to generate a collection of messages that can predomi-
nantly be randomly generated, but has sufficient consistency within the messages that the
distinguisher can’t differentiate.













j will be hidden in the random strings








r′i ∈R Fq i 6= kµmµj i = kµ.
This allows the simulator to produce these messages at random. The prover will choose
mρj ∈R F and set m
µ
j = mj − m
ρ





will appear uniformly random. The fact the distinguisher doesn’t know the indices kρ and




j , and so without these, the
messages would appear uniformly random whether they’re from the prover or the simulator.
This will be the basis of our commitment scheme. For a set of messages {m1, ...,mn}
the prover can commit to each of these pairs as {mρ1, ...,m
ρ
n} and {mµ1 , ...,m
µ
n}, hiding
the ρ messages at the same index kρ and the µ messages at kµ. This means the veri-
fier will end the commitment stage with the linear commitments for the two ‘shares’ of
{m1, ...,mn}, {K(mρ1, kρ), ...,K(m
ρ
n, kρ)} and {K(mµ1 , kµ), ...,K(m
µ
n, kµ)}. It is now
possible for the verifier and prover to engage in a decommitment protocol for any linear
combination, M =
∑n














because now the prover can engage in decommitment for each of these and the verifier can
learn Mρ and Mµ and then add them to get M . The exact commitment scheme is detailed
in Algorithm 19 and Algorithm 20.
Algorithm 19: LINEAR COMMIT
Input : m1, ...,mn ∈ Fq with a space O(s) Receiver, and M =
∑n
i=1 αimi
for αi ∈ F, and security parameter κ.
Output: Receiver holding K(Mρ, kρ) and K(Mµ, kµ), a commitment to Mρ

























to the linear combination K(Mµ, kµ).
Algorithm 20: LINEAR DECOMMIT
Input : Receiver holding K(Mρ, kρ) and K(Mµ, kµ), a commitment to Mρ
and Mµ such that M = Mρ +Mµ, and K(kρ, k1) and K(kµ, k2).
Output: Receiver with M
Receiver



























Computes M = Mρ +Mµ.
94
Theorem 19. Algorithm 19 and 20 form a linear spatially hiding and statistically bind-
ing commitment scheme with a O(s) space verifier and allowing a prover to commit to
m1, ...,mn ∈ F and decommit to M =
∑n
i=1 αimi for αi ∈ F. The security parameter κ






Proof. We need to prove three properties: spatial hiding, statistically binding and linearity.
Spatial Hiding We want to show that the O(s) receiver will fail to uncover the message
with high probability. This comes from the spatially hiding property of Commit, as kρ and





. This means the receiver won’t be able to
uncover mρi or m
µ
i for any i ∈ [n]. Furthermore, the receiver will get no advantage from
repeatedly seeing mρi and m
µ
i for each i as kρ and kµ are both sent only once, and each
message is uniformly randomly distributed without knowing the corresponding other value.
Statistically Binding Again, this property comes largely from the binding property of
Commit. The sender can’t change the committed message due to the fact it can’t change
any of the intermediate messages due to the soundness of PEP and INDEX.
Linear As each of the mρi and m
µ
i are hidden at the same respective index, and we are
storing LDEs of each sent ρ(i) and µ(i), the linearity of LDEs tells us that we can do scalar
multiplication and add two commitments to get a new commitment of the correct linear
combination of the prior messages.
This tells us we do indeed have a linear commitment scheme for receivers of size
O(s) and can adjust the size of κ to give us the desired security guarantee. We do not yet
have everything we need for this to be useful in our zero knowledge protocols. We still want
to show that for a space O(s) simulator with knowledge of M and the linear combination,
the simulator can generate the transcript with high probability. This will tell us that our
linear commitment scheme is zero knowledge, and the receiver never learns {m1, ...,mn}.
Theorem 20. Algorithm 19 and 20 as in Theorem 19 are simulatable by a O(s) simulator
with log(κ) < s with knowledge of M and αi.
Proof. As in Lemma 9, we know Commit and Decommit are both simulatable when the
message is known, with the simulator using space O(log(κ)). We want to show now that
when the message is unknown, as long as the simulator runs the protocol with something
that produces a correct M , the distinguisher has no significant distinguishing advantage.
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If we have {α1, ..., αn} and {m1, ...,mn} with M =
∑n
i=1 αimi, we will have the












i , and due to the spatial hiding property
of the commitment scheme, without learning kρ or kµ there is no way to confidently recover
these intermediate messages.
The simulator will be able to do this in the space required, as each m∗i can be




j being kept. As mentioned
in Lemma 9, the simulator requires space O(log(κ) for the LDE evaluations of the random
strings, and hence we need log(κ) < s.
5.6 Efficient Spatial Zero Knowledge INDEX
Before we introduce the zero knowledge sum-check protocol, we will build our understand-
ing with a relatively simple explanation as to how we transform a pre-existing protocol for
INDEX into a zero knowledge protocol using linear commitments. This protocol is expo-
nentially more space efficient than Algorithm 18.
The following protocol for index is an adaptation of Algorithm 15. We have a




, receiving a vector of length n, A ∈ Fnq , followed by an
index j, with the aim to return Aj . This protocol, as it stands, is in no way zero knowledge.
The verifier learns the LDE of A restricted to a line of its choosing during the instantiation
of PEP.
Our linear commitments allow for this to be avoided. The way we will use it will
be creating a spatial zero knowledge version of PEP.
Theorem 21. Algorithm 21 is a zero knowledge protocol for PEP for a verifier with space






Proof. We need to show that a simulator with knowledge of f(x) can simulate the below
protocol. The crucial similarity with Theorem 20 is that the messages {(f |`(t), t) : t ∈ [p]}
are equivalent to {m1, ...mn}. We are in exactly the same setting as Theorem 19. The
simulator can generate the messages in the same way, the hiding property of the protocol
means that with high probability the verifier wouldn’t be able to see that the values sent
were wrong, and the LDE evaluations will only work for the specific points the verifier
knows and needs.
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Algorithm 21: ZK-POLYNOMIAL EVALUATION PROTOCOL
Input : f(r) for a degree−p polynomial f : Fdq → F, with r ∈R Fdq , unknown
to the prover, and x ∈ Fdq .
Output: f(x)
Prover
Send f(x) to the verifier.
Verifier
Compute the line ` : Fdq → Fdq satisfying
`(a) = r `(b) = x




{(f |`(t), t) : t ∈ [p]}
)
Verifier
Using the linear commitments, construct the commitments of










Send (f(r), r) to the prover.
Prover















Check f(x) = f |`(b) and f(r) = f |`(a).
Furthermore, Algorithm 21 is indeed a correct and sound algorithm. The verifier has
f(r) and x, and can create the line ` in space O(log(n)). The prover sends a claimed f(x)
to start with, and then commits to {(f |`(t), t) : t ∈ [p]. This allows the verifier to construct
the LDEs at the necessary points without learning any of the intermediate values. Before
the prover decommits, the verifier proves it knew the point f(r) on the line beforehand,
hence showing that it has won’t learn any additional information from the decommitments.
The prover and verifier engage in the decommitment protocol so the verifier learns f |`(a)
?
=
f(r) and f |`(b)
?
= f(x). The latter check uses the prover’s sent f(x), which was sent prior
to learning r, so prior to any time the prover could have known the linear combination the
verifier would be comparing it against. The binding property of the commitment scheme
and soundness of PEP prevent the verifier from altering the decommitment to f |`(b), as
changing this value would change the value of f |`(a), which the prover doesn’t know whilst
committing.
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This ZK-PEP allows us to simply swap out the PEP in Algorithm 15 with the above
protocol. This change does multiply the communication of the protocol by the security
parameter κ, but the verifier can continue to work in space O(log(n)). The algorithm is
detailed below.
Algorithm 22: O(log(n))-ZK INDEX
Input : A ∈ Fnq , followed by j ∈ [n]
Output: Aj
Verifier








Theorem 22. Algorithm 22 is a spatial zero knowledge protocol for the index problem
on the string A ∈ Fnq with the verifier having O(log(n)) space, and with O(κ log(n))




Proof. Theorem 21 shows that the ZK-PEP used is zero knowledge, and the above exten-
sion where the verifier views A and forms LDE(A, r) doesn’t do anything to break this.
The simulator would work in exactly the same way, and any summary the verifier kept, so
long as it didn’t break the commitment scheme, wouldn’t allow the verifier to learn extra in-
formation as the commitment scheme is hiding and so the verifier can only learn the values
decommitted to, which will be LDE(A, r) and Aj . The probability the verifier learns in-
formation is the probability the verifier breaks the commitment scheme, which Theorem 19




5.7 Spatial Zero Knowledge Sum-Check
The power of linear commitments have been shown in the previous two sections. In Sec-
tion 5.6, the ability for the prover to commit to messages in such a way that the verifier can
achieve a commitment to a secret linear combination of said messages allowed to us to quite
simply make the INDEX protocol of Cormode et al. [2011] achieve spatial zero knowledge.
We now show that we can use linear commitments to produce a spatial zero knowl-
edge protocol for sum-check. We want to produce a protocol that will allow the verifier,
given a single evaluation of a polynomial g : Fdq → Fq of degree λ, to compute the sum
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of this function over a subset of points. The usual sum-check protocol leaks information of
partial sums of the function, however we have the prover simply commit to these values.
Algorithm 23 shows the non-zero knowledge sum check protocol with the checks
delayed to the last round. In the standard sum check protocol, the check for Σ(gj) will take
place on the jth round. We delay the checks to the end to ultimately simplify the transition
to the ZK version.
We see the intermediate functions gj are leaking the partial sums, which the verifier
couldn’t compute in space O(log(n)). The equality checks the verifier does at the end is
where we will take advantage of linear commitments. In zero knowledge, the verifier will
have a commitment to gj−1(rj−1) and Σ(gj), and will simply check that the difference
of these two commitments is zero, which will prove the consistency between the prover’s
messages without leaking the partial sums.
Our commitment protocol will involve the prover sending linear commitments to




























The verifier can do these whilst the commitments to gj arrive, and can then store the O(d)
commitments until the end, when the prover can decommit to each one at the necessary
points, and the verifier can do the checks. The reason we move the checks to the end is that if
the checks were done part way through, this would require decommits, and this would leak
the kρ and kµ used before we’re finished needing them. There is another issue regarding
simulation. The simulator needs to store the decommitment lines for each commitment,
which would require space O(λd). The verifier in our protocol has space O(d) so we need
to reduce the number of decommitments down to a constant.
Fortunately, this is possible with relative ease. The verifier wants to check that
Σ(gj+1) − gj(rj) = 0 for j ∈ [d − 2]. This is equivalent to checking that the vector of
length d − 2 of Σ(gj+1) − gj(rj) has a fingerprint equal to 0. The verifier picks a random
x ∈R Fq and instead of forming the commitment of Σ(gj) and gj(rj), it adds them to a
running fingerprint, fvecx (gr) and f
vec
x (Σ). The prover, not knowing the secret x used in the






. The simulator will know x, and can therefore generate the lines
used for decommitment in space O(d). Algorithm 24 shows the zero knowledge sum check
protocol.
Theorem 23. Algorithm 24 is a zero knowledge sum check protocol for a O(d) verifier to
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Algorithm 23: SUM CHECK (delayed check)
Input : Verifier with g(r) for g : Fdq → Fq of degree λ and r ∈R Fdq












g(x, k1, ..., kd−1).








For j = 1 to d− 2
Prover






















For j = 0 to d− 2
Check gj(rj) = Σ(gj+1).
Checks gd−1(rd−1) = g(r).
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Algorithm 24: ZK-SUM CHECK
Input : Verifier with g(r) for g : Fdq → Fq of degree λ and r ∈R Fdq





For j = 0 to d− 1
Prover







g(r0, ..., rj−1, x, kj+1, ..., kd−1).
Run












If 1 ≤ j





If j ≤ d− 2







Sends g(r) and x.
Prover
































verify the sum G =
∑
i∈[l]d g(i) for a g : Fdq → Fq of degree λ. It has total communication





where κ < d.
Proof. First, we will handle soundness and correctness. Correctness comes from the cor-
rectness of the original sum-check protocol, and of the commitment protocol. The sound-
ness here is slightly more complex, but as in previous uses of linear commitments, the fact
the verifier reveals secrets isn’t an issue as the commitment scheme is statistically binding.
The total communication comes from the λd commitments, which require the send-
ing ofO(κ) elements, where κ is the security parameter. The verifier requires spaceO(d) in
order to store its random choices. However, the verifier is required to have space O(d+ λ)
as this is the space the simulator requires. As discussed earlier, the simulator can generate
the three decommitments as in Theorem 20, the messages will all be known linear combi-
nations, with the result ‘M ’ known for each decommitment. The simulator will be using
O(d+ λ). This shows the protocol is indeed a zero knowledge protocol.
5.8 Future Work
One direction of research here could be on the possibility of perfect spatial zero knowledge.
At various stages of the design for the protocols above, we would flip-flop between believ-
ing we had achieved a perfect ZK-SIP, to believing they couldn’t exist. In order to define
perfect spatial zero knowledge, it is likely that a much stronger definition would be required
regarding the power of the distinguisher in the streaming setting. It remains to be seen what
restrictions this might place on the power of perfect ZK-SIPs.
Another natural question that would arise with our results in ZK-SIPs would be to
ask what is the limit? As mentioned at the end of Chapter 2, we define SIP to be the class of
problems that can be verified by a logarithmic-round SIP with a polylog verifier and polylog
communication. We discussed the results of Goldwasser et al. [2008] and Cormode et al.
[2012], which tells us that log-space uniform NC is included in this class.
We conjecture that ZK-SIP, the class of problems that can be verified by a spatial
zero knowledge logarithmic-round SIP with a polylog verifier and polylog communication,
also includes log-space uniform NC. The sum-check result, with a polylog κ, strongly
suggests this to be the case, with some work on linearization as in Cormode et al. [2012]
in this setting required to complete this result. A fairly immediate result on classification
of ZK-SIP is that we can at least say it does contain the class of problems that can be
solved by a polylog-space stream verifier in non-zero knowledge, due to the INDEX result.
A further, more interesting, extension is that ZK-SIP also extends the class of problems
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that can be solved by an annotated data stream with a polylog-space stream verifier, and
logarithmic communication. The sum-check result shows us we can solve F2 with a ZK-
SIP, but Chakrabarti et al. [2009] tells us that an (s, v)−annotated data stream requires
sv = Ω(n).
Furthermore, we believe much work can be done on interesting classifications of
SIPs, similar to the work on IPPs of Berman et al. [2018]. We do believe that ZK-SIP6=SIP,
and believe work done in zero knowledge, and specifically statistical zero knowledge, would
give tools required to show that there are ZK-SIPs for NP, potentially even NEXP. Our rea-
soning here for ZK-SIP 6=SIP stems from the fact that so far we have ZK-SIPs for problems
that can be solved with sum-check. Searching for an ‘interesting’ streaming interactive
proof that can’t be solved using some form of sum-check is an open question, and a natural





This thesis reviewed and developed streaming interactive proof protocols with a focus on
efficiency and practicality. We built upon previous work and investigated further the practi-
cal side of streaming interactive proofs. It is our hope that this work and work in this field
will begin to open up the options for real-world implementations of SIPs, for verification of
cloud computing applications.
Chapters 3 and 4 aim to provide lightweight verification options with emphasis on
making the work of the prover largely insignificant next to the cost of solving the problem.
For a large cloud computing company who could be potentially reluctant to massively in-
crease overheads by introducing a verification option, these improvements will hopefully
encourage future implementation.
The advantage of increased efficiency for the prover is two-fold: whilst the cloud
can use these improved protocols, for the problems we’ve dealt with, we can switch the
roles, and imagine a cloud server monitoring the work of several smaller computers. The
smaller computers act as the provers, and the cloud acts as a verifier, checking the work of
the many provers in minimal space.
Chapter 5 looks in a somewhat different direction: we still try to make the protocols
efficient for both parties, however we now attempt to add aspects of data privacy. There are
two natural approaches to data privacy in this setting: The verifier can be the data owner,
trying to analyse the data with the help of the cloud, without the cloud learning anything;
or we can have the prover owning the data, trying to prove it satisfies some property to a
verifier.
We don’t examine the first problem, as it requires a form of encryption known as
fully homomorphic encryption [Gentry, 2009; Gentry and Halevi, 2011]. The prover would
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receive encrypted data, do the analysis on the encrypted data, and send the proof, which the
verifier can decrypt and examine. These encrypted proofs would still fundamentally use the
protocols from Chapter 3 and 4, and further improvements would be deeply set within the
world of the fully homomorphic encryption research.
We study the prover owning the data in Chapter 5. The verifier sees a stream much
larger than the space it owns, and can store some summaries of it. The prover then wishes
to prove a property of the stream, without revealing any additional information about the
stream. The investigation in the above chapter is largely theoretical, simply to prove the
concept of a zero knowledge streaming interactive proof makes sense.
The work of Chapter 5 is currently unpublished, and follows an eighteen month
exploration for a proof of concept for spatial zero knowledge. The work continues to lead
towards a paper complete with the discussed classifications from Section 5.8.
6.2 Extensions and Future Work
The work on practical SIPs is being continued by several research groups [Thaler, 2013;
Daruki et al., 2015; Chakrabarti and Ghosh, 2019]. Our work on practical efficient SIPs
brings the ultimate implementation of verification to cloud computing operations closer and
closer. The minimal interaction approach shows that further investigation on low interaction
(but not constant) SIPs could well yield further efficient protocols.
The main area for future work, however, is by far Chapter 5, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 5.8. The introduction of zero knowledge interactive proofs in the streaming setting
should be of great interest to the theoretical community. Further research of the complexity
classification of ZK-SIPs could produce novel and exciting results in the field of communi-
cation complexity, using previously unrelatable results from SIPs and zero knowledge.
6.3 Closing Remarks
The aim of this thesis was to examine the practicality and limitations of streaming inter-
active proofs. We have discussed and analysed in great detail what can be done with low-
round SIPs, and how these can be applied for machine learning and data science. With the
increased usage of the cloud and outsourced computation, one can hope techniques such as
these will find their way into regular use.
Alongside this, the most exciting result of the thesis is the proof of concept of zero
knowledge streaming interactive proofs. This result, following dozens of failed attempts,
merges the fields of zero knowledge and streaming algorithms. Zero knowledge led to many
remarkable results for IPs, and could well do the same for the world of SIPs and streaming.
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We believe that thorough examination of the classifications of ZK-SIPs, using results from
zero knowledge interactive proofs, one can obtain strong results in communication com-
plexity. Our work in this area continues, and the potential for interesting and innovative
results is well and truly on the horizon.
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László Babai, Lance Fortnow, Leonid A Levin, and Mario Szegedy. Checking computations
in polylogarithmic time. In Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on
Theory of computing, pages 21–32, 1991.
Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, and Nicholas Spooner. Interactive oracle proofs.
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/116, 2016. https://eprint.iacr.org/
2016/116.
Suman K Bera, Amit Chakrabarti, and Prantar Ghosh. Graph coloring via degeneracy
in streaming and other space-conscious models. In 47th International Colloquium
on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2020). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-
Zentrum für Informatik, 2020.
Itay Berman, Ron D Rothblum, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Zero-knowledge proofs of
proximity. In 9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2018).
Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2018.
Manuel Blum. Coin flipping by telephone a protocol for solving impossible problems. ACM
SIGACT News, 15(1):23–27, 1983.
Ran Canetti, Yilei Chen, Justin Holmgren, Alex Lombardi, Guy N. Rothblum, and Ron D.
Rothblum. Fiat-shamir from simpler assumptions. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2018/1004, 2018. https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1004.
Amit Chakrabarti and Prantar Ghosh. Streaming verification of graph computations
via graph structure. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimiza-
tion. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2019). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-
Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2019.
Amit Chakrabarti, Graham Cormode, and Andrew Mcgregor. Annotations in data streams.
Automata, Languages and Programming, pages 222–234, 2009.
Amit Chakrabarti, Graham Cormode, Andrew McGregor, Justin Thaler, and Suresh
Venkatasubramanian. On interactivity in arthur-merlin communication and stream com-
putation. In Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC), volume 20,
page 180, 2013.
Amit Chakrabarti, Prantar Ghosh, Andrew McGregor, and Sofya Vorotnikova. Vertex or-
dering problems in directed graph streams. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1786–1802. SIAM, 2020a.
108
Amit Chakrabarti, Prantar Ghosh, and Justin Thaler. Streaming verification for graph prob-
lems: Optimal tradeoffs and nonlinear sketches. Leibniz international proceedings in
informatics, 176, 2020b.
Anne Condon. The complexity of space bounded interactive proof systems. In Complexity
Theory: Current Research, pages 147–189, 1992.
Anne Condon and Richard J Lipton. On the complexity of space bounded interactive proofs.
In FOCS, volume 89, pages 462–467, 1989.
Graham Cormode, Justin Thaler, and Ke Yi. Verifying computations with streaming inter-
active proofs. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, 5(1):25–36, 2011.
Graham Cormode, Michael Mitzenmacher, and Justin Thaler. Practical verified computa-
tion with streaming interactive proofs. In Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoret-
ical Computer Science Conference, pages 90–112. ACM, 2012.
Graham Cormode, Michael Mitzenmacher, and Justin Thaler. Streaming graph computa-
tions with a helpful advisor. Algorithmica, 65(2):409–442, 2013.
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